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PROLOGUE: REFLECTIONS 
I had the great pleasure and honor of knowing Judge Alvin Rubin. On 
occasion, he was my house guest in Cambridge, Massachusetts when I was 
on the Harvard Law School faculty. He always arrived with a quart of 
shrimp étouffée, which we collaboratively consumed with gusto. I also had 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by ARTHUR R. MILLER. 
 * University Professor, New York University. This Article expands and 
updates my Alvin and Janice Rubin Lecture delivered at the Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center, Louisiana State University on March 8, 2017. I have tried to preserve its 
conversational style. At several points, however, that style did not translate to 
paper, but the substance of my remarks has not been changed. The citations are 
designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
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the privilege of arguing cases before him in the Fifth Circuit.1 As a judge, 
Alvin had “a profound respect for the law and the limitations it imposes 
on judges.”2 His commitment was total. Fellow Fifth Circuit Judge John 
Minor Wisdom once described him as someone born to be on the bench.3 
My remarks in his memory are personal, at times impressionistic, 
reflecting the belief that the aspirational ideas underlying the American 
civil justice system are to promote the resolution of disputes on their merits 
after an adversarial contest on a level litigation playing field with minimal 
technicality. These ideals certainly were the hopes of those distinguished 
lawyers and professors who wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
the 1930s. The drafters wanted to give people access to a meaningful day 
in court and believed that the procedural process should effectuate those 
aspirations. The system the rulemakers created was designed with that in 
mind, and many believed that the Federal Rules represented a Gold 
Standard that envisioned a trial and, when appropriate, one before a jury. 
For example, the rulemakers concluded that simplified pleading 
opened the courthouse door and promoted adjudicating a dispute on its 
merits with a minimum of motion practice. Wide-angle discovery was 
intended to give litigants equal access to all information relevant to the 
case’s subject matter, which always has seemed very American to me. 
How can you be against enabling litigants to be informed? Especially close 
to my heart is the class action, perhaps because I participated in drafting 
the 1966 revision of Federal Rule 23. It was designed in part to provide a 
receptive procedural vehicle for the world of civil rights litigation that 
emerged after the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka,4 in part to promote efficiency—litigants get more judicial bang 
for their judicial buck when like things are aggregated and adjudicated 
together—in part to achieve consistency of result for all people affected 
by the same conduct, and in part to be a mechanism for the joinder of 
modest claims that are not economically viable for litigation on an 
individual basis—what, today, are called negative value claims.5 Finally, 
                                                                                                             
 1. I once argued an en banc appeal before Alvin and 13 of his colleagues. 
None of them asked me a single question during the 30 minutes allotted to me—
the Bench’s silence made it a harrowing experience. When I asked him why years 
later, he simply said with a twinkle, “I don’t like diversity cases and my colleagues 
just wanted to listen to you.” 
 2. See John Minor Wisdom, Dedication: Judge Alvin Rubin, 52 LA. L. REV. 
1371, 1371 (1992). 
 3. See David W. Robertson, Alvin Rubin’s Last Dissent, 70 TEX. L. REV. 7, 9 (1991). 
 4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. I have always believed that whatever small claim class actions may lack 
in terms of significant individual compensation they often make up for in terms 
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the Rules were written to be useful for enforcing the public policies 
embedded in national and state statutes as well as common-law doctrines, 
such as antitrust, securities, civil rights, products liability, and other more 
recently developed substantive fields, such as environment, pension 
protection, privacy, and consumer rights. 
I was blessed by having a wonderful procedure professor, mentor, and 
role model—Benjamin Kaplan of the Harvard Law School—who imbued 
me with the thoughts I just expressed when I was his student and research 
assistant.6 My legal education was followed by an apprenticeship in a law 
firm at a time when litigation practice was relatively civilized and it 
seemed to me that the Federal Rules were working as they were intended 
to work. A few years later, life’s fortuities again brought me together with 
Ben, who had been appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren as the Reporter 
of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States.7 As a result of a delightful constellation of 
circumstances he enticed me to work with him on what a few years later 
became the 1966 amendments to those Rules.8 
In remembering Judge Rubin and thinking about how best to honor 
him, I asked myself whether we are moving toward or away from the 
aspirations of my youth, which I know he shared,9 by looking through a 
                                                                                                             
of deterring wrongdoing. See generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: 
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 6. My indebtedness to Ben is recorded in In Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1354–57 (2011). My involvement in what became the 
1966 Federal Rule amendments is described in Arthur R. Miller, Some Very 
Personal Reflections on the Rules, Rulemaking, and Reporters, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 651 (2013). 
 7. The congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to the Supreme 
Court is set out in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2073 (2012). The multi-tiered federal 
rulemaking process, its scope, and its difficulties are discussed in Robert G. Bone, 
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 
23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996); David 
L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989). 
 8. For what sometimes feels like forever, I have been teaching and writing 
about procedure ever since. On days when I am feeling low, I count the number 
of times I have taught Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) and Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The final count does not lift my spirits. 
 9. He was an optimist about the federal courts and their future. See Alvin B. 
Rubin, The Role of the Federal Courts in the Next 25 Years, 39 LA. B.J. 44 (1991). 
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telescope trained on what is going on in our courts today. What do I see 
after almost 60 years of professional devotion to civil procedure—
admittedly mainly federal? Are the Rules still working as they were 
intended to work? In a nutshell, my judgment is that many of the principles 
I once took for granted have been compromised in the last 30 to 40 years. 
Would Alvin agree with me? I think he would. If I am right, were the 
rulemakers of the 1930s engaged in wishful thinking? Have I been naïve 
all these years? It makes me wonder, as I have over the years: what are 
courts for? Indeed, each year I ask my first-year procedure students that 
question toward the end of the course. They seem baffled by it. I do not 
fault them for being uncertain because, although it seems to be a simple 
question, I always have been uncertain about the answer. What are courts 
really for? I wish I could ask Alvin. 
Is the answer dependent on the movements of time, changes in societal 
conditions, and the self-interest of the participants? In part, most certainly. 
There obviously have been seismic changes in the law and the legal 
profession in my lifetime in terms of demographics, economics, and 
culture. Entire new fields of law have emerged; others have been 
transformed; and some have been eclipsed. We now have massive law 
firms, some are global.10 There even are some large and financially strong 
plaintiffs’ firms. Gender, race, and other professional barriers have been 
lowered but not eliminated so that the bench, bar, and law schools are far 
more diverse than in my youth; the same is true of those who appear in 
court. The scale of cases and the legal fees they generate have escalated 
beyond anything I could have contemplated when I entered practice, as is 
true, for example, in the mass tort and securities fraud fields. New 
professional fields and sub-bars have emerged, including public interest, 
civil rights, entrepreneurial litigators, aggregators, national practitioners, 
sophisticated repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers, children’s attorneys, and senior 
citizens’ specialists. Law school curricula today are interdisciplinary, 
transnational, and sometimes smack as much of graduate programs as they 
do of professional education. And specialization is the order of the day. 
But the cliché is apt: law has become a business—a big one. 
Inevitably, this shift has produced pluses and minuses. Unfortunately, 
there often is so much money on the table that professional judgment and 
client loyalty sometimes are compromised. Resource consumption in 
mega-cases is so extreme that they appear governed by a Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice promoting endless activity. Also, attorney civility seems to be 
                                                                                                             
 10. When I was a young associate, the likelihood of a law firm having as 
many as 100 lawyers was thought to be as remote as putting a man on the moon 
or someone breaking Babe Ruth’s mark of 60 home runs in a baseball season. 
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in decline, all too often being replaced by scorched-earth Rambo litigation 
tactics or Godzilla-like behavior. On the plus side, practicing law today 
can be exciting, intellectually stimulating, ideologically rewarding, and, of 
course, for some, lucrative. Moreover, for about 40 years now, law has 
provided a career for those attracted to social activism or who seek 
involvement in public policy formulation. People now join the profession 
to champion various philosophical objectives, protect the rights of an ever-
expanding range of sub-populations, or press significant causes and 
issues.11 
In evaluating today’s civil justice system, one of its important 
characteristics reflects a piece of Americana that should be kept in mind. 
Unlike the judiciaries in many other countries, we historically have 
employed our courts to press issues of public significance—even absent 
Legislative or Executive Branch authorization or direction—as well as to 
challenge governmental conduct. On the national scene, the Judicial 
Branch, our least democratic branch—in the sense that federal judges are 
not elected and serve for life—generates legal doctrines that produce 
social change in various highly sensitive and contentious contexts. These 
doctrinal shifts by the judiciary often result because the elected branches are 
politically paralyzed, as has been true regarding issues like desegregation, 
political reapportionment, abortion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, 
immigration, and capital punishment, or because one of the branches or a 
state is acting beyond its constitutional or statutory domain and needs to be 
                                                                                                             
 11. Members of the private bar frequently function as a second regulatory 
system and often are dubbed “private attorneys general.” See, e.g., Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 377–84 (1983). See generally SEAN 
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2010); Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney 
General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 219 (2001); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 
95 VA. L. REV. 1131 (2009). The legitimacy and effectiveness of the concept has 
been the subject of a noisy debate and partisan politics over the years, see 
STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) [hereinafter 
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT], and is inextricably 
entwined in the pluses and minuses of the entrepreneurial aspects of much of 
contemporary litigation. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL 
LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015); Myriam Gilles, Can John 
Coffee Rescue the Private Attorney General? Lesson from the Credit Card Wars, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 (2015) (an extended essay based on Professor Coffee’s 
book). Individual lawyers, of course, have different motivations. Some attorneys 
pursue the public interest, some are entrepreneurial, and others have both 
motivations and try to do well by doing good. 
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contained.12 It is an aspect of American exceptionalism. What we do in our 
courts often is very important, indeed critical, for many people and 
institutions, which means that the quality and integrity of the governing 
court procedures also are very important and warrant close attention. 
But are those procedures functioning consistently with the supposed 
objectives of our civil justice system? I will try to respond to that question 
by looking first at economic access to the courts. Ask yourself: how many 
Americans can afford to pay a lawyer by the hour to remedy a grievance? 
And how many lawyers are willing to pursue a claim on a contingent fee 
basis—no matter how clear the merits or how important the matter may be 
to a potential client and others—for $100, $1,000, $10,000, or even 
more—especially if some pretrial discovery and a medical, scientific, or 
economic expert will be needed? Reality requires acknowledging that 
access to the courts has been priced beyond the reach of the vast majority 
of Americans. Honesty also requires us to recognize that meaningful 
access depends on a level of equality of economic resources and legal 
talent between the contestants that does not exist. We simply have not 
come close to achieving that objective; indeed, inequalities in both 
categories may well have increased over time. 
In certain contexts, of course, access is achievable because a contingent 
fee arrangement, or a statutory fee provision,13 or the judicially created 
common-fund doctrine provides compensation for a successful attorney.14 
                                                                                                             
 12. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (political malapportionment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (consensual, private sodomy); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (campaign financing); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 
493 (2011) (prison overcrowding); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(same-sex marriage). 
 13. E.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (creating civil liability on account of a false 
statement in a security registration); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing damages for 
violation of a minimum wage and overtime compensation statute); 42 U.S.C. § 
2000a-3(b) (applying to civil rights actions for injunctive relief for violations of a 
public accommodations statute). 
 14. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Sprague v. Ticonic 
Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The 
common law principle is of limited utility when purely injunctive or declaratory relief 
is sought. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975). Federal statutory fee provisions have not been liberally interpreted. See, e.g., 
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (discussing that a lodestar fee 
computation generally takes account of superior contingent fee attorney 
performance); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (approving a waiver of fees 
under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act) (three Justices dissented). 
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These economic mechanisms can incentivize lawyers, but the obvious 
caveat is that not every type or dimension of claim is an attractive 
candidate for contingent or court-awarded fee representation. And then there 
is the ever-present risk of losing, leaving the lawyer without any fee and 
substantial sunk costs for discovery, experts, protracted motion practice, and 
appeals that cannot be recovered. That unattractive possibility means that 
without the availability of funding and a realistic prospect of surviving the 
process and ultimately succeeding, most contingent fee lawyers would pass 
on investing in a case, effectively foreclosing access. As they say, the 
winners must pay for the losers—the former must be maximized and the 
latter minimized. Of necessity that means some cases will be accepted and 
others rejected, a reality that leaves many unrepresented. Fortunately, pro 
bono entities do offer aid to some individuals, but that hardly is universally 
available, in part because of various eligibility requirements. 
In recent years, a litigation funding industry has emerged in the United 
States, as it has elsewhere, that could enhance the prospect of access if it 
becomes more widely available. At present, it is a work in progress.15 Most 
litigation situations on the plaintiffs’ side, however, do not have the 
economic dimension to be attractive to funders. But there may be a viable 
business model for providing funding for small or medium sized claims, 
particularly when they can be aggregated.16 In any event, for the 
                                                                                                             
 15. Various aspects of litigation funding are comprehensively discussed and 
analyzed in Proceedings of the 2015 Fall Conference with the Center on Civil 
Justice: Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511–
942 (Special Issue 2016); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financers as 
Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1316 (2012) 
(“[A]ssigning a financier a percentage of the plaintiffs’ winnings converts that 
financier into a sizeable stakeholder and incentivizes it to monitor the attorneys 
and the litigation’s costs.”); David R. Glickman, Note, Embracing Third-Party 
Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043 (2016) (describing how third-
party litigation finance would allow lawyers to focus on providing high quality 
legal services); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of 
Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014) 
(discussing the potential of litigation funding in the United States); Victoria 
Shannon Sahani, Judging Third Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388 (2016) 
(suggesting changes in the Federal Rules to allow judges to consider and manage 
third-party funding); Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation 
Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (2015) (proposing a regulatory 
safety net in third party litigation funding arrangements to ensure integrity). 
 16. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Private Dollars for Public Litigation: 
An Introduction, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 813 (Special Issue 2016). Forms of 
crowdfunding are beginning to appear. 
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economically disadvantaged, getting to the justice trough is an obstacle 
not easily navigated. 
Even if a lack of money and difficulties securing a lawyer were not 
barriers for claimants, mounting dockets, cases the size of woolly 
mammoths, and the complexity of modern litigation have produced 
pressures for efficiencies, judicial gatekeeping, and procedural changes 
that often seem at odds with the getting-to-the-merits-with-a-minimum-
of-technicality orientation of the original rulemakers and the assumptions 
of my youth. The last 30 years has seen the erection of a series of judicially 
or legislatively generated procedural restraints—I call them stop signs—
largely motivated, not surprisingly, by and supportive of defense interests. 
These procedural restraints produce earlier and earlier termination of 
cases, avoid merit determinations, and generate substantial litigation costs, 
delays, and risks. This inhibits people from seeking relief in court, leads 
to settlements below market value, or produces premature dismissals. 
Because the impact of these restraints often is related to an individual’s 
access to funding and professional assistance, I think they exacerbate the 
disparities that exist between the haves and the have-nots in our society. 
Perhaps today’s procedural obstacle course is the result of pressures 
created by systemic resource and capacity limitations, or reflects a 
philosophical belief that litigation should be contained and discouraged, 
or is the product of a predictable lobbying response by those interests that 
increasingly have become the object of large-scale damage actions or the 
aggregation of small claims that previously were unviable as individual 
cases and never would have been brought. It is true that some of today’s 
lawsuits have previously unimagined monetary dimensions and other 
consequences that conceivably could devastate an economic entity or 
governmental program. But whatever substance these explanations may 
have, the time has come to recognize that the procedural stop signs that 
have been erected to counter these concerns often work at cross purposes 
with the Gold Standard I mentioned earlier. More attention should be paid 
to the tension between the two and the consequences of the procedural 
paradigm shift that clearly has taken place. 
I. EARLY TERMINATION OF CASES: THE PROCEDURAL STOP SIGNS 
The retrenchment of American civil procedure is best understood by 
examining the recent developments in the federal courts regarding a 
number of important litigation elements. Among the effects of what has 
happened in recent decades is the increased difficulty of enforcing state 
and national public policies, both of statutory and common law origin, 
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through private lawsuits. At present, all three branches of our national 
government display considerable hostility to litigation. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
I start at the genesis of litigation. The permissible constitutional reach 
of the personal jurisdiction of both state and federal courts has been 
reduced in what to me are significant ways. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Daimler AG v. Bauman17 has virtually eliminated general jurisdiction, 
which previously could be based on the defendant’s continuous and 
systematic contacts with the forum even if the events in litigation occurred 
elsewhere. It now is limited to those fora in which the defendant is “at 
home.”18 The decision appears to eliminate longstanding notions of 
corporate presence and doing business and restricts jurisdiction over 
disputes unrelated to the forum to the defendant’s state of incorporation 
and the state of its principal place of business in the United States, except 
in an as yet to be defined “exceptional case.”19 The Court offered no real 
explanation for its deviation from what had long been settled doctrine or 
articulate why the cabining of general jurisdiction was desirable.20 But it 
                                                                                                             
 17. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). See 
generally Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant 
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (discussing new issues Daimler raised that will likely be the 
focus of future litigation); Stephanie Denker, The Future of General Jurisdiction: 
The Effects of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145 (2014) 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding and discussing Daimler’s potential 
impacts on general jurisdiction, the economy, and international affairs); Linda J. 
Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and its Implications 
for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675 
(2015) (discussing the decision’s potential ramifications). 
 18. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The result in Daimler was foreshadowed in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). More 
recently the Court applied Daimler to a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action 
in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017), after concluding that the 
statute did not speak to personal jurisdiction. Only Justice Sotomayor dissented, 
as she had in Daimler. 
 19. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
 20. The Court’s silence on these matters has been viewed as somewhat 
curious. See Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 153, 155–56 (2014) (approving the court’s decision to limit general 
jurisdiction to where the defendant is “at home” based on its overall activities); 
Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1161, 1162 (2015) (“[T]he Court’s efforts are puzzling.”). Justice 
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is clear who benefits from the constriction: domestic and foreign economic 
entities. 
And in the specific or long-arm jurisdiction context, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for four Supreme Court Justices in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro21 reintroduced limiting notions of state sovereignty.22 The 
language is somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s opinion 134 years earlier 
in Pennoyer v. Neff.23 Passages in the plurality opinion seem to subscribe to 
the notion that a defendant must “manifest an intention to submit to the 
power of a sovereign” before a court can exercise jurisdiction.24 How many 
defendants would ever knowingly “manifest”—let alone acknowledge—
such an intention?25 
                                                                                                             
Ginsberg, who I have known since law school, led the Court on this doctrinal shift. 
I am not sure why since I would not have thought it was part of her DNA to limit 
the jurisdictional reach of American courts. 
 21. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 22. Id. at 884–87. New appointments to the Court may increase that number 
to five or more. 
 23. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). That, at least arguably, makes my 
continued teaching of that case rational! 
 24. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882. The meaning—and significance—of McIntyre 
is obscured by the concurrence of Justices Breyer and Alito who joined in the 
result but declined to join in the plurality’s reasoning. Id. at 887. These cases are 
analyzed in John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact 
of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1729–34 (2013); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: 
A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465 (2012) [hereinafter Miller, 
McIntyre in Context]; Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: 
Cabining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 
(2014); Robert M. Pollack, Note, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1088 (2014); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three 
Opinions in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481 (2012); 
Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 417 (2012). 
 25. In a post-McIntyre Supreme Court specific jurisdiction decision, Walden 
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125–26 (2014), the mere fact that the defendant was 
travelling from Atlanta—where the challenged conduct occurred—to Nevada did 
not allow jurisdiction to be asserted in Nevada; the decision adds little to the 
understanding of the Court’s direction and probably should be limited to its 
unusual facts. See also Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial 
connection with the forum State.” (quoting from Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121)). See 
generally Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around 
Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 769 (2015) (suggesting the Court should “overhaul” personal 
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Then last Term, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, San Francisco County,26 the Court held that California could 
not constitutionally assert jurisdiction over non-residents whose claims 
were not related to the defendant’s conduct within the forum state despite 
the company’s extensive unconnected in-state activities and the presence 
of California resident plaintiffs asserting identical claims. According to 
the Court, “a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not 
enough . . . . [W]hat is needed . . . is a connection between the forum and 
the specific claims at issue.”27 Only Justice Sotomayor dissented, pointing 
out: 
What interests are served by preventing the consolidation of 
claims and limiting the forums in which they can be consolidated? 
The effect of the Court’s opinion today is to eliminate nationwide 
mass actions in any state other than those in which a defendant is 
“essentially at home.” . . . Such a rule hands one more tool to 
corporate defendants determined to prevent the aggregation of 
individual claims, and forces injured plaintiffs to bear the burden 
of bringing suit in what will often be far flung jurisdictions.28 
Bristol-Myers prevents potential plaintiffs who are from different 
states from joining an action in a single state that has been brought by 
claimants who reside in that forum. As a result, the ability of multiple 
dispersed plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, or join multiple defendants 
from different states, has been impaired, and may oblige them to bring 
separate related actions in different fora regarding what sometimes even 
may be identical claims. That obviously is inefficient and wasteful for both 
courts and litigants, and is likely to produce inconsistent processing and 
outcomes. Moreover, Bristol-Myers may make it especially difficult for 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction doctrine). In John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after 
Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607 (2015), the author argues 
that Bauman and Walden dispose of the Nicastro plurality. 
 26. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 27. Id. at 1781. Of note, the Court’s opinion does not echo the sovereignty 
thinking expressed in the McIntyre plurality opinion, and it left “open” the 
question of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on a 
federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction as apply to a state court under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1784. 
 28. Id. at 1789. She also wondered what effect the Court’s decision had on 
multistate class and mass actions. See infra note 154. That issue has now arisen 
in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products 
Liab. Litig., Civ. Ac. MDL No. 09-2047 (E.D. La. 2017) (Bristol-Myers does not 
apply to class actions). 
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claimants with small and overlapping claims who reside in less populous 
states. Economic reality may mean that effectively there is no forum in 
any state in which there are enough potential claimants to constitute a 
critical mass of plaintiffs that can be aggregated.  
I have no idea how often this contraction of the jurisdictional reach of 
American courts over matters having a nexus to this country or to a 
particular state will enable economic entities—domestic as well as 
foreign—to create jurisdictional safe havens to the disadvantage of 
plaintiffs without sufficient resources to chase possible wrongdoers. At a 
minimum, the Court’s decisions have put the question of personal 
jurisdiction “in play” more often than in the past, encouraging motions to 
dismiss at a case’s threshold with attendant cost and delay. Long-arm 
jurisdiction clearly is getting shorter.29 
B. Pleading 
Moving along the litigation timeline, the sudden appearance of 
“plausibility” pleading is next on my list of procedural stop signs. The 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 and 
its elaboration two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal31—two particular 
objects of my concern about what is happening to the Gold Standard—
have reintroduced fact pleading by calling for a showing of “plausibility” 
in a federal complaint and in those states that choose to follow the two 
federal decisions. That development effectively authorizes fact evaluation 
and possibly merit determinations on what for centuries has been purely a 
law motion that simply asked whether the complaint “stated” a legally 
cognizable claim. Whether that claim is “provable” or “trial-worthy” or 
“for the jury” are questions that supposedly are to be left for later stages 
                                                                                                             
 29. If the shortening of the jurisdictional reach of American courts is coupled 
with the Supreme Court’s presumption that federal substantive statutes do not 
apply extraterritorially, the result may be to deprive many citizens and non-
citizens of a domestic forum for challenging foreign conduct having an effect in 
this country. E.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) 
(Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)).  
 30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89 (2007) (per curiam), decided days after Twombly, the Court reversed a 
dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint for failing to satisfy the Federal Rules’ 
pleading standard. The subsequent Iqbal decision, however, made clear that 
Erickson was not a retreat from “plausibility pleading.” The complaint’s striking 
facts made its sufficiency fairly obvious. 
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of the litigation. These two decisions came out of the blue. One night I 
went to sleep believing that I lived in the access-oriented world of notice 
pleading, something repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court for 50 
years.32 I woke up in a world of fact pleading. I felt as if I had been 
transported back to New York’s 1848 Code of Procedure.33 
The two decisions ignore the reality that at the outset of many cases 
there is a significant information asymmetry between plaintiffs and 
defendants, typically favoring defendants. Plaintiffs rarely know why a 
complex machine malfunctioned or why a pharmaceutical appears to have 
deleterious side effects. To make the demand for facts in the complaint 
even more consequential, the Court said there can be no discovery—not 
even “spotlight” or “pinpoint” discovery to help establish a claim’s 
plausibility—until the plaintiff has pled a “plausible” case, which often 
means not until the complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6).34 It is tantamount to telling a plaintiff: “You must plead what you 
don’t know and the system won’t help you find anything out before it 
dismisses you.”35 To me, Twiqbal—a quaint, but irreverent, shorthand for 
                                                                                                             
 32. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1215 (3d ed. 2004). Starting with Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Supreme Court repeatedly endorsed the notion of 
simplified notice pleading. E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 
(2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 33. The Court’s reasoning and various critiques of it are discussed at length 
in the materials cited infra notes 34–40. 
 34. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 665. The Court has been criticized sharply for 
effectively amending Federal Rule 8(a) without following the rulemaking process 
prescribed by statute. E.g., Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, 
Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 575 (2012) 
(“The Supreme Court has acted lawlessly.”). Other commentators also have been 
critical. See generally Edward D. Cavanuagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 892 (2012) 
(“Twombly has shifted the balance of power in federal court decidedly in favor of 
defendants.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play 
on the Federal Rules]; Alex Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility 
Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility 
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008). 
 35. I think a more reasonable approach is that taken by the Ninth Circuit in 
cases involving the analogous context of pleading fraud under Federal Rule 9(b) 
in which that court has excused the failure to allege facts the plaintiff cannot 
“reasonably be expected to have access,” Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1503 
(9th Cir. 1995), or relaxed Rule 9(b) “as to matters within the opposing party’s 
knowledge,” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 
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the two cases—is inconsistent with a systemic commitment to getting to 
and resolving a case on its merits.36 It appears to have resulted in lengthier, 
over-inclusive, protracted pleadings as well as increased motions to 
dismiss and appeals from dismissals that have to be decided on the basis 
of a single document—the complaint—with no discovery, no summary 
judgment, no trial, and no jury. There also is reason to believe that the 
increased risks and burdens of “plausibility” pleading inhibit the 
institution of cases that might have proven meritorious. Of course, it is 
quite difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether that inhibition is real, 
or how frequently it occurs, let alone figure out how many of those 
unasserted claims might have proven meritorious.37 
According to the majority opinion in Iqbal, “plausibility” is to be 
judged by subjective and ambiguous factors such as “judicial experience” 
and “common sense.”38 It defies reality to think that judges with radically 
different educations, philosophical orientations, and social backgrounds 
                                                                                                             
1989); see also Rubenstein v. Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C., 687 F. App’x 564 
(9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal reversed because “without an opportunity to conduct 
any discovery” the plaintiff “cannot reasonably be expected to have detailed 
personal knowledge” of the defendant’s “internal pricing policies or procedures” 
and thus “need not specifically plead facts to which she cannot ‘reasonably be 
expected to have access’”).  
 36. See generally Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, supra note 34; 
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, supra note 34; Alex 
Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1, 1–
2 (2012) (noting the change in pleading standards among lower courts). Before 
the two Supreme Court decisions, I would quip in class that the last time a motion 
to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) was granted was in the McKinley 
administration. The fact that McKinley’s presidency ended 37 years before the 
Rules were promulgated apparently never was noticed by the students. 
 37. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery, 
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE 
L.J. 2270 (2012) (an attempt to measure the effects of Twombly on party 
behavior); William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 693 (2016) (a thought experiment by the author based on a 
hypothetical pleading regime he creates). 
 38. Twombly and Iqbal have been characterized by some scholars in political 
terms, employing words such as “judicial activism,” or as part of the “right/left” 
dichotomy, or furthering “conservative” and “corporate” interests. See, e.g., Kevin 
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 850 (2010) (“Many observers . . . see the same old right/left 
story: the conservatives seek to protect rich or powerful defendants, while the 
liberals stand with the little plaintiffs.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (2010) (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal can be 
read as favoring “corporate and business interests”). 
2018] WHAT ARE COURTS FOR? 753 
 
 
 
will have comparable “judicial experience” or “common sense.”39 Thus, 
what has always been a motion addressed to a question of law now is 
dependent on what lies in the eyes of the judicial beholder regarding the 
pleaded facts, which lowers predictability, reduces the likelihood of 
consistency of result, and engenders protraction.40 The desire to separate 
litigation chaff from litigation wheat is understandable, but there are other, 
more merit-preserving techniques than through a heightened pleading 
requirement that can lead to premature termination. 
C. Class Actions 
Next, there has been a debilitation of the class action. To state the 
obvious, the growth in class action practice following the 1966 amendment 
of Federal Rule 23, which was designed to make the procedure more user 
friendly, was revolutionary. Most of the Rules Advisory Committee 
members wanted to create a mechanism for cases they believed would 
profit from aggregate handling and intended to give the procedure enough 
functionality and clarity to enable it to operate efficiently and fairly. As a 
hedge against unknown future developments in the law and society, to be 
cautious, and to protect absent class members, they wisely contained the 
somewhat adventuresome Rule 23(b)(3) “damage” class action with 
special procedural safeguards—requiring the common questions to 
predominate over individual questions, insisting that the class action be 
superior to other adjudicatory techniques, providing individual notice of 
the action to identifiable absent class members, and giving the class 
members a right to opt out. These procedures were imposed in addition to 
the court’s obligation in all class actions to assure the adequacy of the class 
representative, select class counsel, award counsel fees if the class is 
                                                                                                             
 39. This point was made forcefully by a former federal judge in Nancy Gertner, 
A Judge Hangs Up Her Robes, 38 LITIG. 60, 61 (2012); see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 
115 (2009) (“The discretionary power of the judge to follow his or her personal 
preferences in deciding the plausibility of a complaint is enlarged to the extent that 
direct allegations of liability-creating conduct can be thus disregarded.”). 
 40. In Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 333 (2016), the author, a frequent commentator on pleading (as well 
as my co-author), suggests that there are indications in post-Twiqbal Supreme Court 
decisions that offer a way of preserving the pre-plausibility structure of notice 
pleading regarding the limited judicial function on a motion to dismiss. 
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successful, and approve the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a 
settlement.41 
Surely the Committee members could not have foreseen what was to 
come in the following decades: the explosive recognition of new 
substantive rights by federal and state statutes and judicial activity; the 
wide-angle invocation of the class action for civil rights and other public 
interest purposes; the enlarged dimension, scope, and economic stakes of 
many class actions; and the frequency—let alone the character—of 
product and commercial failures and other adverse events that would give 
rise to aggregate litigation.42 That combination of forces created a perfect 
storm for generating unprecedented class action activity. Depending on 
one’s perspective and attitude regarding the class action as well as the 
character of the cases invoking the procedure, the result of the 
Committee’s labors can be viewed positively or negatively. All would 
agree, however, that the world of class actions was completely 
transformed following the 1966 revision. 
Class action practice expanded dramatically in the years following 
1966. It became the procedural vehicle of choice across a wide range of 
substantive fields43 and was recognized as the best—often the only—way 
                                                                                                             
 41. Much of the history of the process that produced the 1966 revision of Rule 
23 is recounted in John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were 
We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 333–45 (2005). See generally 7AA 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1777-84.1, 1804–05 (3d ed. 2005); An Oral 
History of Rule 23: An Interview of Professor Arthur R. Miller by Professor Samuel 
Issacharoff, Ctr. on Civil Justice Papers 1 (2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites 
/default/files/ICCVCJUS17.1-CCJ%20Rule%2023%4050%20Booklet%20Project 
_RELEASE.pdf [https://perma.cc/P39R-VF4W]. 
 42. My co-author on the Federal Practice and Procedure treatise, who was 
part of the rulemaking process at the time of the revision, expressed the opinion 
that not many Federal Rule 23(b)(3) cases would materialize. Charles Alan 
Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552, 567 
(1966). Three years later Charlie confessed error. Charles Alan Wright, Class 
Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969). The caution in the Advisory Committee Note 
accompanying the revised rule that a “mass accident . . . is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action” seems quaint in retrospect given what has happened 
since 1966. As a percipient witness to events both in the Advisory Committee 
meetings and as a result of numerous contacts with Committee members and the 
Reporter outside of meetings, I can say—with a touch of nostalgia—you had to 
be there to appreciate how that passage in the Note came into being. 
 43. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (antitrust); 
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discrimination); Dunn v. 
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to pursue a remedy for small claims that were not economically viable on 
an individual basis.44 The procedure was employed by both public interest 
and entrepreneurial lawyers to challenge various forms of discrimination, 
enforce public policies, pursue compensation for various economic 
injuries, and remedy a wide range of other types of misconduct that 
impacted large groups of people. Some commentators have referred to this 
period as a “Golden Age” of class actions.45 But every action breeds a 
reaction, and eventually resistance to class actions intensified, especially 
in the mass tort and physical injury contexts.46 A polarized and contentious 
debate set in, which continues to this day,47 often accompanied by 
proposals for further revision of Rule 23 and other facets of complex 
litigation.48 
                                                                                                             
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 
291 (2d Cir. 1968) (securities). 
 44. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The amount-in-controversy requirement in 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) limited the class action’s utility in diversity of citizenship 
cases. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (requiring that each 
class member in a Rule 23(b)(3) action satisfy the diversity of citizenship statute’s 
amount-in-controversy requirement). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546 (2005), the Court concluded that the enactment of the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, effectively overruled Zahn. The enactment of the 
Class Action Fairness Act has largely eliminated the amount in controversy issue in 
diversity-based class actions. See infra notes 58–61. 
 45. See Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in 
the Twenty-First Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 499–504 (2016) [hereinafter 
Marcus, Bending in the Breeze] (supporting the belief that aggregate litigation 
will continue); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: 
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 404 (2014) (proposing 
a more limited role for class litigation) [hereinafter Mullenix, Ending Class 
Actions as We Know Them]. 
 46. A group of virtually simultaneous court of appeals decisions rejecting the 
certification of personal injury classes were instrumental in turning the tide. 
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (epilepsy drug); 
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (tobacco addiction); In 
re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (defective penile implants); 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (contaminated blood supply). 
 47. I naively tried to calm the waters. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein 
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). 
 48. The Rule has been amended several times since 1966. Additional 
amendments are now working their way through the rulemaking process. See COMM. 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 25–
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That Golden Age is long over. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-
Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes,49 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,50 Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.,51 and other cases52 have made class certification and 
                                                                                                             
27 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JE7-R86L]. They are not major. One of the most inventive 
academic proposals is to reconceptualize the class as an entity and focus on the 
adequacy of its representation. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as 
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). Some issues never seem to be 
definitively resolved. For example, more than 50 years after it was decided that Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions should be opt-out in character, some scholars continue to 
advocate they be opt-in or that such a possibility be available in particular cases. See, 
e.g., Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171 
(2016); Mullenix, Ending Class Actions, supra note 45, at 441; see also John 
Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903 
(2005) (advocating limiting class settlements to those who consent to them by opting 
in). 
 49. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). But cf. id. at 375 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with 
the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry 
so that it is no longer ‘easily satisfied.’”). Although Rule 23 establishes different 
categories of class actions, some evidence exists that cases like Wal-Mart seem to 
obscure the differences between and among them, sometimes making certification 
even more difficult to achieve. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 843 (2016) (arguing that courts should engage in a broader analysis that takes into 
account all of the subtypes described in the class-action rule). 
 50. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 51. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 52. There have been other negative class action decisions by the Court. E.g., 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (determining the court of 
appeals failed to apply a proper injury-in-fact or concreteness standard in a Fair 
Credit Reporting Act case), on remand, 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that an inaccurate website report alleged a sufficiently concrete injury), 
cert denied, 138 S.Ct. 931 (2018), 2018 WL 491554; Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (upholding a no-class-action-or-class-
arbitration clause despite the obvious economic unviability of individual litigation 
or arbitration); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35–38 (2013) 
(determining plaintiffs’ expert regression model was not acceptable to show 
damages on a class-wide basis for purposes of establishing predominance); AT&T 
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 536 U.S. 333, 340, 351–52 (2011) (enforcing a 
no-class-action arbitration clause despite California law on contract 
unconscionability). Most recently, in California Pub. Emps.’ Retirement Sys. v. 
ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017), the Court applied the three-year repose 
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012), applicable to actions under § 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa, to bar the claim of a class member 
who opted out after three years to bring its own action. Four Justices dissented. 
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settlement approval more difficult to secure and generated procedures that 
have become very labor and resource intensive. Courts not only demand 
“rigorous” adherence to the Rule 23 requirements, particularly 
predominance,53 but also explore merit issues when they are intertwined 
with any of the certification requirements.54 It is somewhat ironic that 
                                                                                                             
The effect of the decision is to compromise the “constitutionally shielded,” ANZ 
Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2057 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting), opt-out right when it is 
exercised after the repose period expires either because the court denies class 
certification or the class member learns of a settlement proposal he deems 
inadequate after the time limitation has run. The ANZ Secs. decision may 
encourage class members to file protective actions to preserve their individual 
litigation option, further complicating global resolution of disputes. Some 
decisions by the Court have been more hospitable. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046–47 (2016) (allowing sample evidence as to 
employee practices in a Fair Labor Standards Act case to establish predominance); 
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (determining that a 
consumer class complaint under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
challenging advertising use of a third party’s involvement in unsolicited text 
messages was not rendered moot by an unaccepted offer of judgment). 
 53. The Supreme Court demanded a “rigorous analysis” initially in Gen. Tel. 
Co. Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). It has been repeated as catechism many 
times since. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2412 (2014) (noting plaintiffs must “prove each requirement of Rule 23, including 
. . . predominance”); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., L.L.C., 687 F.3d 583, 592, 594, 
596–97, 605 (3d Cir. 2012) (reversing class certification and demanding higher 
factual proof of the class definition, class ascertainability, numerosity, and 
causation); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir. 
2008) (remanding certification because the district court seemingly departed from 
the “rigorous analysis” standard); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, 
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 23’s requirements must be given their 
full weight independent of the merits.”), abrogated on other grounds by Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007) (“rigorous” analysis showed that differences in 
various aspects of states’ laws meant that common questions did not predominate); 
In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (class 
certification requires a ruling on each Rule 23 requirement regardless of any overlap 
with merit issues); McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 
2003) (individual issues of reliance precluded certification on various theories). 
 54. See, e.g., Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 35–36 (damage measurement); 
Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 1076, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(determining statute of limitations issue relevant to class certification); In re Rail 
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding 
scrutiny of damage model relevant to class certification); Szabo v. Bridgeport 
Machs, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that when there is an overlap 
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many of the protections for absentees the rulemakers crafted in the 1966 
revision have become burdensome points of contention on the certification 
motion. 
Moreover, defense lawyers and litigants who generally find 
themselves on the right side of the “v.” in class actions, as well as some 
courts, have exerted pressure to impose new procedural requirements that 
are not prescribed in the Rule, such as demanding the ascertainability of 
every class member when certification is sought,55 even though that does 
not seem necessary and is not particularly useful until the case is resolved, 
                                                                                                             
between the merits and Rule 23(b)(3) issues, “[T]he judge must make a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits.”). 
 55. The courts of appeals are divided on whether there is a heightened 
ascertainability requirement, although the trend seems to be going against 
recognizing it. Compare In re Petrobras Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“[W]e decline to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a 
showing of administrative feasibility at the class certification stage” because it is 
not consistent with Rule 23.); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 
1123 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (not requiring class 
proponents to demonstrate that it is administratively feasible to identify class 
members); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., L.L.C. v. Medfox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 
996 (8th Cir. 2016); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (deeming objective criteria such as online 
sales, receipts, and identification by physicians sufficient); Mullins v. Direct 
Digital, Inc., 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) 
(rejecting heightened ascertainability), with Byrd v. Aarons, Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 
162–63 (3d Cir. 2015) (requiring the class to provide a “reliable and 
administratively feasible” method for determining membership); Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310, 312 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting class of purchasers of an 
inexpensive over-the-counter product for lack of ascertainability); Karhu v. Vital 
Pharmacies, Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949–51 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring objective 
criteria for identification). See also City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of 
N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Affidavits, in combination with 
records or other reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the 
ascertainability standard.”). See generally Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class 
Action Limits: Parsing Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Press, 65 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 913, 913–39 (2017); Sarah R. Cansler, An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to 
Class Action Certification? The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement's Effect 
on Small Consumer Claims, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016); Geoffrey C. Shaw, 
Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354 (2015). The Advisory Committee 
considered the ascertainability question for almost three years but abandoned 
further consideration of the subject. See Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective 
of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017). If enacted, the Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation Act of 2017, H. Rep. 985, 115th Cong. (2017), discussed infra note 66, 
would demand heightened ascertainability. 
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or requiring a showing that each class member has been injured56 and is 
seeking the same remedy. There also has been pressure to eliminate the so-
called “it ain’t worth it” actions or those actions that might result in over-
deterrence or overcompensation—matters that seem highly speculative at 
the certification stage.57  
                                                                                                             
 56. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–50 (holding plaintiff must show an injury 
in fact that is concrete and particularized), on remand, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2017) (concluding that website inaccuracies concerning age, marital status, 
educational background, and employment concrete for Fair Credit Reporting Act 
standing); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding 
that there was a substantial risk of injury from a data breach); In re: SuperValu, 
Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017) (data breach was not shown to create a 
“substantial risk” of injury); Eike v. Allergen, Inc., 850 F.3d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 
2017) (finding regret or disappointment about a product is not injury for standing 
purposes). Thus far the courts only have required that the named representatives 
show a cognizable injury to satisfy the standing-to-sue requirement. See In re: 
SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763; In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 802 (5th 
Cir. 2014); see also Phillips, 736 F.3d 1076. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Eric 
L. Cramer & Caitlin V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured 
Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858 (2014). However, these decisions preceded 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549, in which the Court 
said that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 
statutory violation.” Since then a number of courts have dismissed actions under 
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1), which 
limits the number of credit card digits that can be included on receipts, because 
the only injury alleged was an increased risk of identity theft. The courts 
concluded that a bare allegation to that effect lacked a “degree of risk sufficient 
to meet the concreteness requirement.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. See, e.g., 
Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Perre, L.L.C., 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016); 
Hendrick v. Aramark Corp., 2017 WL 1397241 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2017). There 
are similar decisions under other statutes. See, e.g., Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, 
Inc., 830 F.3d 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (District of Columbia Consumer Protection 
Procedures Act). Compare Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336, 
1337 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding disclosure of a consumer’s personal information 
was a sufficiently concrete injury to provide standing under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act, but the action was dismissed because downloading the defendant’s 
app for free did not make the plaintiff a statutory “subscriber”), with Cole v. Gene 
by Gene, Ltd., 2017 WL 2838256, at *4–5 (D. Alaska June 30, 2017) (finding 
disclosure of plaintiff’s DNA satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement). The proposed 
Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, described in note 66, infra, has a demanding 
injury requirement. 
 57. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235 (9th Cir. 
1974) (applying the standard used in Ratner, cited below, to Sherman and Clayton 
Act actions); Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal. 
2012), aff’d in part, 583 F. App’x 803 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining certification 
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In addition, when Congress became more conservative and responsive 
to business interests, corporate and other defense groups secured the 2005 
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)58—a misnomer if 
                                                                                                             
would limit Laguna Beach’s “ability to protect the health, safety and welfare of 
the city”); Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 697 (S.D. Fla 2009) 
(holding that a class action was not “superior” for purposes of satisfying Rule 
23(b)(3) “in light of the potentially annihilating” damages it might inflict); Shields 
v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972) (determining 
potential $100 million class recovery was grossly disproportionate given that the 
class members had suffered no damage and the defendant had gained little benefit; 
such a recovery is a “possibly annihilating punishment”); Ratner v. Chem. Bank 
N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (expressing concern that a 
class action might inflict “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, 
unrelated to any damage”). But see Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 23(b) does not permit consideration of the 
proportionality of liability to actual harm and reversing a denial of class 
certification); Murray v. GMAC Mort. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that defendant’s potential enormous liability is an impermissible 
factor in a Rule 23(b) superiority analysis). A proposal to add a Rule 23(b)(3)(F) 
to the effect that the court consider “whether the probable relief to individual class 
members justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation” on a motion to certify 
under Rule 23(b)(3) was offered to the bench and bar by the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee in the 1990s. It was almost universally opposed and dropped by the 
Committee. For a glimpse into some reactions to that proposal, see COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 36–38 (1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/6VLK-LQTQ]; see also Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future 
of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 937–46 (1998) (discussing the arguments 
for and against the proposal); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the 
Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 621–22 (1997) 
(suggesting the proposal might violate the Rules Enabling Act). 
 58. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715. With 
certain very limited exceptions, the Act embraces all class and “mass” actions 
with 100 or more members with claims having an aggregate value exceeding 
$5,000,000 and only requires minimal diversity of citizenship. Unfortunately, the 
statute does nothing to reduce the stringency with which the class certification 
prerequisites have been applied by the federal courts in recent decades in multi-
jurisdictional diversity-based class actions or ameliorate the difficult choice-of-
law issues caused by differences in state law those cases often raise. See, e.g., 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) (decertifying a 
nationwide class because the law of all states would have to be applied); Cole v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding differences in state laws 
meant predominance not satisfied); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 
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ever there was one. The Act virtually federalizes class actions of any 
substantial dimension, thereby marginalizing involvement by state 
courts.59 In my view, it is a blatant affront to federalism.60 But there is an 
irony. By alleviating certain historic subject matter jurisdiction limitations 
to capture these cases in the federal courts, such as the complete diversity 
of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements applicable in non-
class diversity cases, the Act has enabled the aggregation of modest 
monetary state law claims so that an array of matters that previously could 
not have been brought as class actions in federal court now can be, which 
is particularly significant in the consumer protection field.61 
In my judgment, the class action now has reduced effectiveness in 
several respects. It has less utility as a means of promoting the private 
enforcement of important public policies, particularly in the civil rights 
and employment fields, which supplements government enforcement. Its 
efficacy as a deterrent to large-scale wrongdoing has decreased. Its 
usefulness as a remedial mechanism for compensating those injured by 
public or private wrongs has been compromised. And finally, to some 
extent, elements of the plaintiffs’ bar have been discouraged from acting 
                                                                                                             
(6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying nationwide products liability class action because the 
negligence law of 50 states would be impossible to be applied as would instructing 
the jury); Powers v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 892 F.R.D. 313 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (same). 
See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 41, § 1780.1; Samuel 
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006); Larry Kramer, 
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996); Arthur R. 
Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions 
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986). 
 59. State law class actions still may be brought in state court if they fall within 
one of the limited exceptions in CAFA permitting that, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–
(4), the defendant fails to remove, or if a federal court has declined to certify. See 
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 60. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between preemption and 
federalism, see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006). 
 61. See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008) (discussing the expansion of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction over class actions); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action 
Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdiction Reform, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008) (analyzing CAFA’s centralizing impact on 
American law and government). 
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as private attorneys general and some of its members have become 
extremely risk averse.62 
The procedural rigors that now burden class action certification 
obviously weigh particularly heavily on plaintiffs. The reality is that 
today’s judicial treatment of the class action has made pursuing 
certification a time-consuming and expensive process, one that often is 
nearly or completely impossible to navigate successfully, leading some 
knowledgeable scholars to question the long-term viability of the 
procedure.63 I, however, disagree with their calamitous forebodings; to 
paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of class actions are “greatly 
exaggerated.”64 In some parts of the country and in certain substantive 
                                                                                                             
 62. See generally David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 777 (2016) (noting that public interest classes are not being certified today 
for reasons that would have been nearly unimaginable a decade ago); Arthur R. 
Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic 
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296–300 (2014) [hereinafter Miller, Preservation 
and Rejuvenation] (describing the current difficulties of securing class 
certification). Questions about the legitimacy and utility of private enforcement 
have been part of the class-action debate. One negative frequently asserted is that 
private enforcement occasionally creates a risk of over-deterrence or over-
enforcement, particularly when there has been a small or technical violation of a 
statutory scheme that affects a large number of people in some marginal way. See 
generally Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 45, at 520–30. That has led 
to a denial of certification in some cases. See the citations supra note 57.  
 63. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 161 (2015); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-
Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) 
(asserting that class actions will soon be “virtually extinct”); Robert H. Klonoff, 
The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (providing an 
excellent description of the then current state of affairs); four years later the author 
was somewhat more optimistic: Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A 
Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017); Georgene Vairo, Is the 
Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 477, 528 (2014) (“[C]lass actions . . . have taken a huge hit.”); see also 
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (arguing that class actions 
undermine foundational constitutional principles); Mullenix, Ending Class 
Actions, supra note 45; Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class 
Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 
64 EMORY L.J. 451, 462 (2014) (arguing that class attorneys should be viewed as 
the fiduciary or guardian of the absent class members). 
 64. Class action litigation, it turns out, is hard to kill off. See Linda S. 
Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 516 (2013); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel 
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contexts, class actions actually appear to flourish, although in others they 
languish or are stillborn. Despite the gloomy picture painted above, a few 
years ago I expressed the view that “there are some rays of light that 
indicate it will survive.”65 I stubbornly repeat that belief. 
The pessimistic views are either understandable expressions of 
frustration, possibly tinged with a touch of despair, or wishful thinking 
depending on the speaker’s or writer’s point of view. Objectively viewed, 
however, the demise of the class action would be completely at odds with 
the litigation system’s contemporary needs. In today’s world, a procedural 
system cannot function with a reasonable degree of efficiency by 
processing a substantial number of overlapping or related claims one-by-
one. Abandonment of the class action and other multi-party consolidation 
devices is not a reasonable option. Not only is effective aggregate 
litigation a matter of common sense, it is a matter of the rational utilization 
of litigant and judicial system resources. That efficiency is in everyone’s 
interest. Nonetheless, a bill has passed the House of Representatives that 
would further burden class actions in very significant ways and probably 
extinguish or dim the “rays of light” to which I referred.66 
One reason for optimism is the willingness of some federal judges in 
recent years to employ the passage in Rule 23(c)(4), stating that “when 
                                                                                                             
Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017) 
(describing how the class action is getting a second life). Actions under Rule 
23(b)(1) to avoid prejudice always were thought to be the exception not the rule 
and have not figured prominently in the class action debate; actions under Rule 
23(b)(2) for injunctions primarily to stop discrimination or public policy 
violations also have largely avoided the brunt of the controversy.  
 65. Miller, Preservation and Rejuvenation, supra note 62, at 306. Professor 
Richard Marcus, who is my co-author on the Federal Practice and Procedure 
treatise and an Associate Reporter of the current Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, echoes my thought in his text, Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 
45. I hope we are not travelling down a primrose path. If the reader has patience, 
perhaps the “rays of light” I perceive will become apparent. 
 66. The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th 
Cong. (2017). The bill cleared the House in days without any hearings or public 
discussion. Among other things it would require an affirmative demonstration that 
“each” class member “suffered the same type and scope of injury,” that class 
members be ascertainable, that attorney’s fees be limited to a reasonable 
percentage of the monies “directly distributed” to class members and postpone 
payment of fees until the distribution to class members has been “completed,” 
eliminate issue classes, and postpone discovery until various motions, including 
the motion to dismiss, have been decided. Id. Simply put, the legislation would 
cripple class action practice. So, one might ask for whom would the proposed 
“Fairness Act” provide “fairness.” 
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appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with 
respect to particular issues.” Admittedly, the provision is ambiguous as to 
whether it is an independent basis for class certification or presupposes 
that all other prerequisites, most notably predominance in Rule 23(b)(3), 
must be satisfied before the court can treat one or more issues on an 
aggregate basis, leaving the remaining issues for individual treatment.67 
The former construction, creating what now is called single-issue 
certification, has been gaining traction. 
A good example is Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co.68—a product defect 
consumer class action involving mold in washing machines. The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a denial of certification of one of 
two separate classes that advanced two different breach-of-warranty 
theories. The opinion is very pragmatic, focusing on the need for courts to 
handle partially overlapping cases efficiently. Judge Richard Posner, 
writing for the court, concluded that the central liability question of 
whether the washing machines were defective could be determined on a 
                                                                                                             
 67. The ambiguity is exemplified by two 1996 court of appeals decisions that 
expressed opposite views on the point. Compare Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, 
Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common questions do not 
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire 
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to 
isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class 
treatment of these particular issues.”), with Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734, 745–46, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The proper interpretation of the 
interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a 
whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3).”). It is unclear 
whether Castano’s rejection of single-issue certification is still good law in the 
Fifth Circuit. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014). 
Another unclear decision is Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 
441–43 (4th Cir. 2003). The subject has attracted considerable academic interest. 
See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 41, § 1790; Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855 (2015); 
Laura J. Hines, Codifying the Issue Class Action, 16 NEV. L.J. 625 (2016); Jon 
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification 
of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (2002); 
Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121 (2015). 
 68. Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); see also In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading 
Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 839 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
class action prerequisites were satisfied in a related washing machine mold case), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). 
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class-wide basis, leaving damage matters to individual proceedings if 
liability were established.69 
In 2014, a year after the Butler decision, the Seventh Circuit reiterated 
its receptivity to the aggregate adjudication of portions of identical 
consumer claims in In re IKO Roofing Shingle Products Liability 
Litigation,70 when it again vacated a denial of class certification in another 
home products case. The court of appeals rejected the district court’s 
conclusion that “commonality of damages” among class members was 
“legally indispensable.”71 The class’s two theories of damages both 
matched its liability theory. The IKO panel acknowledged, but was not 
concerned, that one of the damage theories would require buyer-specific 
hearings and could not be handled on a class-wide basis in the event the 
common liability questions were established in the class’s favor; it simply 
cited Butler.72 
These two decisions show that some judges are willing to employ the 
class action whenever the determination of one or more significant class-
wide issues will meaningfully advance the litigation’s resolution.73 Other 
                                                                                                             
 69. Butler, 727 F.3d at 801–02. Judge Posner’s Butler opinion can be traced 
back to his earlier opinion in MacReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (allowing certification of the issue 
whether the defendant’s practices had a discriminatory effect). His earlier opinion 
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 867 (1995), was far less accepting of single-issue certification. 
 70. In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 71. Id. at 603. 
 72. Id. The Seventh Circuit explicitly embraced this view in Suchanek v. 
Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014), another consumer products case 
reversing the district court’s denial of class certification. See also Parko v. Shell 
Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (cautioning that the common issue 
must “greatly simplify the litigation” to avoid creating risks). 
 73. The materially-advance approach also has been approved by the Manual 
for Complex Litigation and the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION § 21.24 (4th ed. 2004); AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (2010). Sometimes, it is difficult to determine 
whether the court is deciding the certification question on the basis of the 
existence of a meaningful common single issue or because some other Rule 23 
prerequisite, such as predominance, is satisfied. For example, in Johnson v. Nextel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2015), a failure to satisfy the 
materially-advance standard was characterized as a lack of both predominance 
and superiority. In Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 602 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2015), the 
court upheld certification on the basis of “liability” being common but spoke in 
terms of predominance, which a single issue occasionally can satisfy. 
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courts have accepted single-issue certification but have used different 
formulations for deciding when it is appropriate to do so.74 This single-
issue class action concept, if it is ultimately accepted by the Supreme Court 
and survives the current threat of being legislatively overruled by 
Congress,75 holds great promise for proceeding on an aggregate basis in 
the future in various substantive contexts.76 
                                                                                                             
 74. See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(stating common antitrust questions of conspiracy and impact “drive the 
resolution of litigation” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
350 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 
F.3d 255, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2011) (accepting the concept of single-issue 
certification and offering numerous factors for determining when it is appropriate 
to use it); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(indicating that a single issue must “materially advance the litigation”); In re 
Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing 
certification of a single issue relating to the propriety of strip searches); cf. In re St. 
Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008). Another case in the same vein, 
although not phrased in single-issue terms, is Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 
(11th Cir. 2004), which held that a common question in a Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organization action predominated. Other cases recognize single-issue 
certification but decline to employ it because of the circumstances of the particular 
case. E.g., Gates, 655 F.3d 255; McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215; Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). Also, Judge Pryor’s opinion for an en 
banc court in Graham v. R.J. Reynolds, Tobacco Co., 782 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 
2015), seems quite accepting of issue classes, liability-only class determinations, 
and bifurcation. 
 75. If enacted, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 
115th Cong. § 1.03 (2017), described supra note 66, would prohibit certifying any 
issue under Rule 23(c)(4) unless all class action certification requirements are 
satisfied with regard to the entirety of the cause of action from which the issue 
arises, effectively overruling Butler and IKO. As resistance to class action 
certification has increased and the burdens associated with that process have 
magnified in the United States, class-action-like and other aggregation procedures 
have developed in many other nations. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, From 
Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading Globally, 65 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 965 (2017). This is somewhat ironic because in the Golden Age of 
the American class action many around the globe took pleasure in saying at 
conferences or in private conversation that our practice under Rule 23 was quite 
irresponsible and unacceptable. 
 76. The subcommittee of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee appointed to 
evaluate and propose amendments to Rule 23 undertook a consideration of single-
issue classes, but abandoned the subject after almost two years. See ADVISORY 
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 87 (Nov. 5-6, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee- 
rules-civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/VD4J-6N3Z].  
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D. Discovery 
Another illustration of the stop-sign phenomenon relates to discovery, 
which no longer is fully committed to providing litigants equal access to 
all relevant data as was the original objective of the Rules promulgated in 
1938. There have been sequential restrictions on it by Federal Rule 
amendments over the past 40 years,77 including redefining the scope of 
discovery, reducing its availability, and creating presumptive limits on its 
use. Additionally, the most recent amendment imposes a new 
“proportionality” requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) to be applied by 
“considering” six factors, a few of which are quite amorphous or subjective. 
Some observers are concerned that this latest linguistic change creates an 
additional restraint on the availability of discovery. Its significance is yet to 
be seen.78 At a minimum, “proportionality” shows signs of producing a fair 
                                                                                                             
 77. Since 1983 almost all the amendments to the Federal Rules relating to 
discovery have encouraged judges to contain the process. See Arthur R. Miller, 
Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 
353–56 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure]. It seems 
fairly obvious that discovery restrictions can impact other procedural and 
substantive policies and should be undertaken cautiously. Broad access to discovery 
is often a necessity in lawsuits under federal substantive statutes and other matters 
of public policy because in those contexts, we often are especially dependent on 
litigation to augment governmental enforcement of federal normative standards. 
Events in both the financial and real estate markets during the last severe recession, 
for example, have laid bare the consequences of under-enforcement of federal 
regulatory policies. It seems odd, therefore, to impede the efficacy of private 
enforcement of national as well as state policies by limiting discovery. Discovery is 
often the key that opens the door to information critical to remediating violations 
of important constitutional, statutory, and common law principles. See generally 
Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981) 
(explaining that discovery is essential to “the evolution of substantive law”). 
 78. See David Crump, Goodbye, “Reasonably Calculated,” You’re Replaced 
by “Proportionality”: Deciphering the New Federal Scope of Discovery, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2016) (“[T]he criterion of ‘relevance’ is intentionally 
demoted in importance.”); Patricia H. Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant 
Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 
(2016) (opining that proportionality will likely further restrict the ability to obtain 
information). A more optimistic view—I hope it is not wishful thinking—is 
offered in Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After 
the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 28–33 (2016) (arguing that the 2015 
amendments are unlikely to alter practice under the Federal Rules significantly). 
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amount of motion practice.79 Although individually these amendments 
might not represent a dramatic undermining of federal discovery, 
collectively they clearly look in a philosophically different direction than 
did the original rules, which allowed discovery of anything “relevant to 
the subject matter of the action” and were designed to operate in a simple, 
self-executing way.80 
                                                                                                             
Some courts have quoted the Chief Justice’s enthusiastic—some might say 
overstated—description of the amendment, even though his remarks are not part 
of the Rule itself. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/public 
info/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf (“The amendments may not look like a big 
deal at first glance, but they are.”) [https://perma.cc/KU69-JBC3]. A recent 
canvas of the cases under the new discovery rules in the class action context by a 
distinguished proceduralist who was involved in drafting the new rules suggest 
no significant changes in governing principles has taken place. Robert H. Klonoff, 
Application of the New Discovery Rules in Class Actions: Much Ado About 
Nothing, 71 VAND. L. REV. ___ (2018).  
 79. See, e.g., Panel Specialists, Inc. v. Tenawa Haven Processing, L.L.C., 
2017 WL 3503354, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2017) (concluding that a request for 
specific information concerning the markups charged other customers was not 
proportional to the needs of the case and would burden a small, family-owned 
company; the magistrate judge thought it was a close case); In re Bard IVC Filters 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016) (stating that the 
proportionality inquiry “requires input from both sides”); Hibu, Inc. v. Peck, 2016 
WL 4702422, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016), review denied, 2016 WL 6462044 
(D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2016) (“Moving the proportionality provisions to Rule 26 does 
not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all 
proportionality considerations . . . .”); Jackson v. E-Z-GO Div. of Textron, Inc., 
2016 WL 6211719, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2016) (finding that compelled 
discovery of “information from former counsel, information from independent 
third parties that currently perform services for Defendants, and claims that may 
involve one of the four design features of concern” was not disproportionate); 
Robertson v. People Magazine, 2015 WL 9077111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015) 
(“[T]he 2015 amendment does not create a new standard; rather it serves to exhort 
judges to exercise their preexisting control over discovery more exactingly. . . .”). 
 80. It is generally acknowledged that in routine litigation, discovery is 
modest—often nonexistent—in keeping with the dimension of the case, and 
usually does not require judicial supervision. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. 
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES 2 (2009) (discussing findings from a survey of attorneys regarding 
discovery in recently closed civil cases); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. 
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2010). 
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E. Expert Witnesses 
Hearings to qualify expert witnesses have proliferated and become 
protracted. This shift is primarily because of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,81 which in the name of 
judicial gatekeeping—admittedly a worthy objective—has made expert 
qualification for testimonial purposes on economic, scientific, and 
technical matters more difficult to achieve and a major procedural obstacle 
with attendant risks, costs, and delays. On occasion, the Daubert hearing 
has become a trial within a trial. This process most likely burdens plaintiffs 
more heavily than defendants and, of course, is yet another pretrial stop 
sign. Indeed, given the importance of expert testimony in many types of 
cases, the Daubert hearing can amount to a “Road Closed”—not merely a 
temporary “stop”—sign. 
F. Summary Judgment 
Finally, resort to the summary judgment motion clearly has increased 
in recent times; when the motion is granted, it operates as a terminal stop 
                                                                                                             
 81. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Two other cases 
complete the Daubert trilogy. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 
(1999) (applying Daubert to a tire failure expert witnesses); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
exclusion of scientific epidemiological expert testimony). See generally Andrew B. 
Gagen, What is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner and 
Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 401, 447 (2002) (discussing the broad impact of the Daubert trilogy on 
environmental litigation); Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden Significance of Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Compass for Problems of Definition and Procedure 
Created by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603, 646 
(2000) (emphasizing how the broad discretion given to judges as “gatekeepers” 
creates inconsistency in results); Christopher B. Hockett, Geraldine M. Alexis & 
Christina M. Wheeler, Revisiting the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Antitrust 
Cases, 15 ANTITRUST 7 (2001) (finding that after Kumho Tire’s application of 
Daubert to soft sciences, challenges frequently succeed even against highly 
qualified experts, and can involve extensive evidentiary hearings). Most states have 
adopted the Daubert approach, but recently the Florida Supreme Court rejected 
inserting it as a rule in the Florida Evidence Code because of “grave concerns about 
the constitutionality of the amendment” in terms of its possible effect on the jury-
trial right and access to the courts. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 
210 So. 3d 1231, 1239 (2017). 
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sign.82 Indeed, it was the 1986 Supreme Court decisions in Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett,83 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,84 and Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,85—the so-called summary judgment 
trilogy—that began the procedural retrenchment I am describing. The 
opinions in these cases appear to have encouraged heightened invocation 
of the motion by establishing a nebulous “plausibility” standard that, like 
the previously discussed pleading “plausibility” standard governing 
motions to dismiss, seems to promote fact-finding and evidence-weighing 
by judges. As is true of the motion to dismiss, a summary judgment motion 
will be decided on the basis of judicial subjectivity and a paper record—
sometimes an obscenely large one—not live testimony subject to cross-
examination, let alone a trial with a jury.86 Thus, a motion historically 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A 
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 896 (2007) (showing an increase in motions 
made from 12% to 21% of the sample cases from 1975 to 2000 and an increase in 
the grant rate from 6% to 12% in those years); Joe S. Cecil, Trends in Summary 
Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, 1 FJC DIRECTIONS 11, 16–17, 19 
n.10 (1991) (discussing the increase in summary judgment motions filed, opining 
that the increase may be because of increased dispositions of asbestos cases). See 
generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court 
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1074–1132, 1048–57 
(2003) [hereinafter Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment]. 
 83. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 84. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 85. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 86. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). This highly controversial decision, 
see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837 (2009), is exhaustively analyzed in Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris and 
the Future of Summary Judgment, 15 NEV. L.J. 1351 (2015). Professor Wolff 
expresses concern that the Scott opinion has destabilized the historic presumption in 
favor of the non-moving party, as well as the practice of looking at the record in the 
light most favorable to that party, and has inappropriately permitted interlocutory 
review of a denial of the motion. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. 
Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (2011); Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 
82, at 1074–1132 (evaluating the importance of oral testimony and jury trial); Nathan 
S. Richard, Judicial Resolution of EMTALA Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 635 (2012) (“The frequent inability of plaintiffs suing under 
. . . [the Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act] to survive a summary 
judgment has substantially curtailed the Act’s capacity to remedy and deter disparities 
in emergency-department screenings. At summary judgment, many federal courts . . . 
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designed solely to determine whether a case is trial-worthy or resolvable 
by the court as a matter of law has been transmogrified into a judge’s 
subjective exploration of the claim’s “plausibility.” 
The concern is that the motion may now be used to dispose of cases 
that previously might have been considered trial-worthy because the 
record revealed a “genuine dispute as to [a] . . . material fact,” in theory 
the only issue to be decided on a summary judgment motion according to 
Federal Rule 56 and its many state counterparts. That result, I believe, 
contravenes our commitment to a right to a meaningful day in court, 
elements of due process, and trial by jury when applicable.87 Because the 
motion is primarily a defense weapon, it is not surprising that it is invoked 
primarily by defendants. Moreover, the process of making, responding, 
and adjudicating the motion has become protracted, resource consumptive, 
and, when granted, vulnerable to reversal on appeal. One suspects that in 
many instances it might be more efficient to try the case, raising the 
                                                                                                             
are highly deferential to the assertions, judgments, and perceptions of treating 
physicians. To the extent that this practice constitutes a ‘weighing of the evidence,’ it 
amounts to an aggressive, if not improper, use of summary judgment.”). 
 87. See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 310–12 
(observing that what is being decided “as a matter of law” has been enlarged); 
Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 82, at 1062–72, 1074–77 (arguing 
that the summary judgment trilogy has promoted paper trials); David L. Shapiro, 
The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of 
Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 359, 386–87 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 
2d ed. 2008) (summarizing the tension between summary judgment and 
constitutional concerns); see also John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 539–43 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is 
inherently pro-defendant); Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We 
Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 709–
10 (2012) (discussing the high rate of summary judgment grants in favor of 
defendants); Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the 
Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV 193 (2014); cf. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 
1861, 1866 (2014) (reaffirming that evidence is not to be “weighed” on a summary 
judgment motion and must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party). In a recently published book, SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. 
THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION 
LAW (2017), the authors persuasively argue that the hyperactivity in granting 
summary judgment motions in civil rights, age discrimination, and disability 
cases—all matters governed by protective federal statutes—usurps the role of the 
jury on such questions as what constitutes discrimination by effectively engaging 
in fact-finding and deciding how the facts should be applied. An extreme position 
on this subject is taken in Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 148–58 (2007) (contrasting the summary 
judgment motion with English common law procedural devices). 
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question of what really motivates the widespread invocation of the 
motion.88 When today’s summary judgment practice is combined with the 
other procedural impediments I have catalogued and others I might have 
added to my list,89 I am led to ask: what has happened to that relatively 
uncluttered Gold Standard of my youth?90 
                                                                                                             
 88. Obviously, the interposition of a summary judgment motion postpones (and 
possibly eliminates) any trial and probably lowers the settlement value of the case. A 
distinguished federal judge takes a dim view of the frequency with which the motion 
is made, the resources expended, and the marginal results achieved. Victor Marrero, 
The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1663–70 (2016). 
 89. For example, a number of years ago the Supreme Court imposed 
constitutional limitations on punitive damages, previously thought to be a matter of 
state law. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503–15 (2008) 
(limiting punitive damages in admiralty); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423, 425–26 (2003) (limiting punitive damages under the 
Due Process Clause); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) 
(same); TXO Prods. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993) (same). 
In effect, these cases federalized the question of how to define the upper limit of a 
punitive damage award. The decisions by the Court preempting state law on that 
subject have been criticized. See generally Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. 
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 10 (2004) 
(discussing the potential harms caused by unchecked jury awards of punitive 
damages and judicial responses to such harms). Additional stop signs take the form 
of judicial receptivity to motions to dismiss based on standing, preemption, 
immunity, abstention, exhaustion, time limitations, and other threshold matters. 
 90. I have written extensively—some might say excessively—on these matters. 
See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77; Miller, McIntyre in 
Context, supra note 24; Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors 
Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 587 (2011); Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, supra note 
34; Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 82. A number of prominent 
proceduralists have as well. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right 
of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims Against Businesses, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 537 (2013) (discussing the “subversion” of Rule 23(b)(3)); Judith Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). 
The effect of these procedural developments in two important public policy arenas 
is canvassed in Suzette Marie Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-
Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on 
Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455 (2014); Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: 
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 
DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307 (2010). Other commentators argue that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions “interpreting” (some would say “amending”) the Federal Rules 
and on other procedural matters have been designed to curtail the private 
enforcement of statutory rights and other public policies. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank 
& Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
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II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The easy-access philosophy underlying the original Federal Rules 
welcoming citizens to the courthouse also is being displaced by significant 
pressures that are diverting disputes from the public court system to 
mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.91 
Many businesses and employers now insist on private dispute resolution 
with their customers and employees through the widespread use of 
contractual mandatory arbitration provisions that expressly forbid resort to 
the courts; many of these provisions also prohibit the use of any form of 
aggregate arbitration. These clauses impact important areas of substantive 
law and affect a range of consumer, financing, employment, and small 
business transactions. These activities are engaged in by millions of 
people. Thus, dispute resolution is being privatized by a process that is 
invisible, under the control of industry, not constrained by rules of 
evidence or procedure, and lacks any meaningful judicial or other review. 
The expansive use of contractually mandated arbitration undermines 
the availability of the class action and other aggregation methods. It is 
fueled by the Supreme Court’s seemingly boundless application of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).92 Of particular concern is the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
1543 (2014) [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform]; Judith Resnik, 
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 924, 928–30 (2000); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the 
Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006); A. Benjamin Spencer, The 
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010); 
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts 
Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 314–32 (2012). 
 91. See the comprehensive discussion of this subject in Judith Resnik, The 
Privatization of Process: Celebration and Requiem for the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802–06 (2015). 
 92. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified 
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). Some statutes void arbitration clauses in certain 
limited contexts. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (except for residential 
mortgages and car loans, arbitration clauses in payday loans and consumer credit 
contracts with members of the military and their family members are void); 15 
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in automobile 
franchise agreements). On the other hand, some federal statutes provide for the 
arbitration of disputes. E.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
of 1947, Pub. L. No. 114-38 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y); 
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 205(c)(1), 92 Stat. 3045 
(codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 220529) (any party aggrieved by a 
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validation of these clauses—including their class action and aggregate 
arbitration waivers—in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion93 and 
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant.94 To me it was strikingly 
inappropriate to do so in these cases. Concepcion involves a consumer’s 
claim that the defendant had advertised a “free” phone but then improperly 
charged him $30 for sales tax. Italian Colors is a federal antitrust action 
pursued by small businesses that asserted claims that were not 
economically substantial enough to be brought as individual actions or 
arbitrations. 
Concepcion authorizes the preemption of state contract law doctrines, 
such as unconscionability (the Arbitration Act might have been interpreted to 
preserve them),95 and, like CAFA, is another example of the federalization of 
state law claims.96 Italian Colors enables the circumvention of federal 
substantive statutes, such as the antitrust and securities laws, because the 
                                                                                                             
determination may seek review by any regional office of the American Arbitration 
Association); Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-364, § 4221(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1401) 
(any dispute between an employer and the sponsor of a multiemployer plan 
concerning a pension determination); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1847 
(2010) (SEC rule on investor agreements). 
 93. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also 
DirectTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 94. Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). The Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) reaffirmed its bar on enforcing pre-
dispute class action waivers after the Supreme Court decisions. Charles Schwab 
& Co., 2014 WL 1665738, at *18 (FINRA April 24, 2014). 
 95. 9 U.S.C. § 2. In Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 
1421, 1426 (2017), the Court reaffirmed its preemption of any state contract rule 
that reflects “discrimination on its face against arbitration” and “displaces any rule 
that covertly accomplishes the same objective.” The Court struck down 
Kentucky’s requirement of a “clear statement” waiving “the right to go to court 
and receive a jury trial” because it was “tailor-made to [apply to] arbitration 
agreements” and singled them out “for disfavored treatment.” Id. at 1423; see also 
Allied Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that state 
laws singling out arbitration clauses are subject to the FAA). So much for 
Kentucky’s attempt to protect the exercise of two constitutional rights. 
 96. See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333 (consumer claim); Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (state claim against a nursing 
home); Circuit Cities Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 106 (2001) (state sex 
discrimination claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991) (age discrimination); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
(California’s Franchise Investment Law). 
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Court simply has declared that the Arbitration Act trumps them.97 In effect, 
the Court has created a powerful federal common law of arbitration.98 Thus, 
a supposed, but largely judicially fabricated, national commitment to 
arbitration has enabled a dramatic impairment of access to the courts. The 
decisions also deprive people of the opportunity to participate in a class 
action or aggregate arbitration of related and sometimes identical matters, 
which often is an economic necessity since the individual claims typically 
have a negative value from a dispute resolution perspective.99 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 228 (antitrust claims); CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization Act); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities 
claim); Shearson Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (stating that an antitrust claim 
will be “effectively vindicated” in an arbitral forum); Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 
866 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
 98. See Michael J. Yelonsky, Fully-Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 
90 OR. L. REV. 729 (2012). 
 99. The extraordinary expansion of the FAA’s application by the Supreme Court 
and the statute’s legislative history are discussed in Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The 
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration 
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1426–32 (2008); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration 
Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265 (2015); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory 
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never 
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Judith Resnik, Diffusing 
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, The Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860–71 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing 
Disputes]; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1631, 1635–42 (2005); see also Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: 
Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 317 [hereinafter Gilles, 
The Day Doctrine Died]. The diversion of disputes to arbitration and other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution also have been thought desirable to help ameliorate the 
growing caseloads in the federal courts and to husband their limited resources. See, 
e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981) 
(stating that the purpose of the FAA is “to relieve congestion in the courts and to 
provide parties with an alternative method of dispute resolution”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
Congress also has promoted this movement. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 621–658). As 
a distinguished scholar of the subject has pointed out, the “Supreme Court has not 
produced a single decision finding arbitration inadequate, inaccessible, or ineffective 
to vindicate rights.” Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra, at 2886. I submit, as she and 
the dissenting Justices have, that American Express fits that description perfectly. I 
sense (perhaps it is unjustified optimism) that some courts are not eager to extend the 
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In the consumer and financing fields, as well as in many employment 
and small business contexts, these no-class-or-aggregate-arbitration 
clauses are completely adhesive.100 They are not the product of arm’s 
length bargaining—or any bargaining—in most cases. Invocation of the 
“freedom of contract” cliché to justify them defies reality. Nonetheless, 
people are being subjected to these clauses in contracts about a wide range 
of basic consumer transactions involving both societal amenities and 
necessities as well as being denied the protection of federal statutes and 
state law.101 Some academics depressingly express concerns that 
permitting the enforcement of these clauses is the “coup de grace”—the 
end of any effective aggregate procedure for handling a wide variety of 
claims that have been subjected to mandatory arbitration provisions.102 
The Supreme Court’s decisions are based on a statute enacted almost 
a century ago for resolving inter-corporate disputes between sophisticated 
entities, not consumer, employment, or small business claims. It is 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions. For example, in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 
P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017), the California Supreme Court declined to enforce an arbitration 
clause in a credit card agreement waiving the right to seek public injunctive relief in 
any forum. The court concluded that a California statute providing that “a law 
established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement,” CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2017), is a generally applicable contract defense, does not 
discriminate against arbitration, and therefore is not preempted by the FAA. Id. at 94–
98. But cf. the cases cited supra note 95. 
 100. Various aspects of the utilization of these clauses are discussed in the 
following articles. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 871 (2008); Gilles, 
The Day Doctrine Died, supra note 99; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99; 
Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American 
Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal 
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015). 
 101. The Court was once far more protective of consumers and employees 
regarding arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953); 
cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The same is true of people 
who lacked “bargaining power,” see, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally J. Maria 
Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 
3052 (2015); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99, at 2836–39. 
 102. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation 
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627, 658–
60 (2012) (“Class actions are on the ropes.”); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra 
note 99 (arguing that the diffusion of disputes to private, unaccountable, and 
unknowable adjudicators is unconstitutional). 
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apparent that the Court’s striking attraction for arbitration reflects its sense 
of the limited resources of the federal judiciary and perhaps a lack of 
confidence in state and federal trial courts, as well as a mistrust of juries; 
it also may be a byproduct of the anti-litigation campaign that has been 
waged for several decades in the courts and the public arena by the defense 
bar and business interests.103 
Moreover, despite Justice Scalia’s assertion in his Concepcion and 
Italian Colors opinions that group arbitration does not work and is 
inconsistent with the supposed economies and efficiencies of arbitration,104 
there is considerable experience with aggregate and class arbitration that 
does not reveal any intractable difficulties.105 And what of the other values 
that are at stake? Little or no attention has been paid to the possibly 
deleterious effect of those clauses on traditional due-process notions based 
on the day-in-court principle, the jury trial guarantee, federalism, 
transparency of process, substantive law development, and the need for 
oversight of arbitration practices, let alone to the potential negative effect 
on the enforcement of important public policies that result from diverting 
dispute resolution away from the public court system.106 
                                                                                                             
 103. See discussion infra notes 173–182. 
 104. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 228; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333; 
see also Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012); Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 105. At the time Concepcion was decided, the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association provided for class arbitration. AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY 
RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files 
/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/GGS4-AX5A]. See generally David Horton, Mass Arbitrations and Democratic 
Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2014). The Court’s negative view of group 
adjudication in favor of arbitration stands in contrast with the apparent growth in 
the use of class actions and other aggregation techniques in the courts. See generally 
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 
126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1643 (2017) (“As a practical matter . . . [these procedures] 
offer agencies important new tools to respond to rising case volumes while 
promoting legal access.”). 
 106. The many critical commentaries on the two Supreme Court decisions 
include Carrington, supra note 90; Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died, supra note 99; 
Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 204 n.136 
(2015) (arguing mandatory arbitration violates freedom of association). See 
generally Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99, passim (the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration decisions have created an unconstitutional system); see also Lauren Guth 
Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers 
Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 329 (2015); Sara E. Costello, Class Action Waivers Hang in the 
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It seems obvious that most people are not even aware that they are 
limited to one-by-one arbitration should they have the fortitude and want 
to pursue a claim against their contracting partner.107 The available 
evidence shows that arbitration is rarely invoked on an individual basis.108 
Almost no consumer, employee, or small business has the ability, training, 
or resources to navigate the arbitration process effectively.109 It simply is 
not a meaningful substitute for the possibility of going to a court of limited 
monetary jurisdiction or vicariously participating in a class action or 
aggregate arbitration proceeding.110 In the few instances in which 
individual arbitration is pursued, the claimant typically is opposed by a 
substantial company represented by a lawyer experienced by prior 
participation in similar proceedings and an arbitrator who may well have 
                                                                                                             
Balance, 42 LITIG. NEWS, Winter 2017, at 10 (2017); Jack Downing, Note, An 
Important Time for the Future of Class Action Waivers and the Power Struggle 
Between Business and Consumers, 81 MO. L. REV. 1151 (2016). But cf. Michael 
Hoenig & Linda M. Brown, Arbitration and Class Action Waivers Under 
Concepcion: Reason and Reasonableness Deflect Strident Attacks, 68 ARK. L. REV. 
669, 670 (2015) (“There are several cogent reasons for the continued vitality of class 
action waivers.”). 
 107. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTIONS ACT § 1.4.2, at 11 (Mar. 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201 
503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter ARBITRATION 
STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS] (finding that consumers are generally unaware of 
whether their credit card contracts include arbitration clauses) [https://perma.cc/QTM4-
33JD]. 
 108. Id. § 7.3, at 8 (describing the infrequency of individual consumer-initiated 
arbitration claims in the credit market); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, An 
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 1 (2011). 
 109. The assertions in the Supreme Court’s majority opinions in these cases 
that arbitration is more effective, cheaper, faster, and less burdensome than 
litigation are subject to doubt given the absence of empiric proof to that effect and 
the lack of the metrics needed to make the comparison. See Andrea Cann 
Chandrasekher & David Horton, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of 
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, 
supra note 99, at 2812–14 (“[T]he number of documented consumer arbitrations 
is startlingly small.”). Some commentators, however, argue that arbitration is 
preferable to the class action. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, 
Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the Future Hold After 
Concepcion?, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345 (2013). 
 110. This was the conclusion of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 
its arbitration report. See ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 
107, § 1.4.3, at 11. 
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an economic interest to favor repeat players.111 Moreover, lawyers 
frequently are unwilling to undertake arbitration claims, especially on an 
individual basis. In short, the picture is so discouraging that people 
overwhelmingly decide not to pursue their claims despite their potential 
merits. 
Two things should be mentioned that somewhat ameliorate the effects 
of Concepcion and Italian Colors. First, in certain contexts a very 
significant percentage of mandatory, no-aggregation arbitration clauses 
have a carve-out that allows the consumer to go to a small claims court.112 
They generally are thought to be consumer friendly. Many of those courts, 
however, do not have class action or aggregate procedures, and some are 
not empowered to grant equitable relief to stop a practice found offensive. 
Second, both the American Arbitration Association and the Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Service (“JAMS”), the two most significant 
providers of arbitrator services, have protocols assuring a modicum of 
procedural regularity.113 
Although there initially was some movement in Congress to overturn 
the Supreme Court’s decisions by legislation,114 that movement has 
become extremely unlikely given the outcome of the 2016 presidential and 
congressional elections. Similarly, the young Federal Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),115 which was created as a watchdog agency 
                                                                                                             
 111. Sometimes, the deck appears stacked against the claimant. See Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Beware of the Fine Print Part II, in 
Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization- 
of-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (part of a three-part series critical of arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts) [https://perma.cc/E5A7-2Q8P]. 
 112. See ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 107, § 1.4.1, at 10. 
 113. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1980); 
JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), https://www.jamsadr.com 
/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-2009.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/X78F-YC4Z]. 
 114. E.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2929 (2011); 
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Cong. § 22 (2011). Neither 
bill got out of committee. The current bill is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, 
S. 537, 115th Cong. § 402 (2017) (invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
in the employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights contexts). 
 115. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 
(2012). The Bureau issued a report based on an extensive study that is extremely 
critical of various arbitration clause abuses. ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 107, § 1128(a). See generally Nicholas M. Engel, Comment, 
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following the mortgage crisis during the last decade and seemed so 
promising to consumer advocates a short time ago, has not been able to 
secure the effectiveness of its recent arbitration rule that would have 
effectively eliminated the application of Concepcion and Italian Colors in 
an array of important consumer contexts. 116 Immediately after the rule was 
promulgated by the CFPB, the business community led by the Chamber of 
Commerce attacked it in Congress, which has the statutory power to reject 
administrative agency rulemaking.117 First the House of Representatives 
voted against the rule along partisan lines without any meaningful 
deliberation.118 Then, after months of intense lobbying and a war of words 
involving a large number of interested parties, the Senate also rejected it.119 
Thus, the arbitration rule will not go into effect.120 This represents a major 
                                                                                                             
On Waiving Class Action Waivers: A Critique and Defense of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s Proposed Regulations, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 231 (2016). 
 116. 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017). The rule was issued on July 10, 2017 and would 
have gone into effect in 2018. The Chamber of Commerce and some members of 
Congress immediately called for the rule to be rejected by Congress. See Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule Could Let Consumers Sue Financial 
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2017, p. 1, col. 6, https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-banks.html [https://perma 
.cc/SL25-6FRH].  
 117. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808. 
 118. See, e.g., Michael Macagnone, House to Vote to Overturn CFPB Arbitration 
Rule, LAW360 (July 24, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/947461/house-to-
vote-to-overturn-cfpb-arbitration-rule [https://perma.cc/6UWU-BSNW]; Yuka  
Hayashi, House Votes to Repeal CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-repeal-cfpbs-arbitration-rule-15 
01017889?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/U3SM-82CZ]. 
 119. With two exceptions, the Senators voted along party lines and divided 50 
to 50. That tie enabled Vice President Pence to cast the deciding vote to reject the 
CFPB’s rule. It is impossible to know what avenues consumer interests may pursue 
regarding arbitration clauses in the future. In addition to the challenge in Congress, 
major business groups brought lawsuits in federal court attacking the 
constitutionality of the rule. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Case No. 3:17-cv-02670 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017). 
A day after President Trump officially nullified the CFPB’s work product, these 
actions were voluntarily dismissed.  
 120. Had the rule gone into effect it arguably would have represented a 
“congressional command” that would have overridden the judicial construction 
of the Arbitration Act, thereby limiting the application of Concepcion and Italian 
Colors in important consumer contexts. See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 
570 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 
98, 101–02 (2012); see also the cases cited infra note 125.  
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defeat for the CFPB and a corresponding victory for the business 
community. Beyond the loss of the arbitration rule fight, the very 
existence, or at least the leadership and direction of the Bureau, 
undoubtedly will change.121 Such is the tenor of the times in the United 
States. 
There are possibilities for limiting the application of some aspects of 
the arbitration decisions, however. The Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari122 and heard argument in a consolidated trio of cases that may 
determine whether Concepcion and Italian Colors apply to employment 
contracts or whether bans on aggregate litigation and group arbitration in 
that context are unenforceable because they are inconsistent with the 
policies and procedures of the National Labor Relations Act.123 Other 
                                                                                                             
 121. Plans have been underway for some time to circumscribe the CFPB’s 
scope of operation, The Editorial Board, Hands Off the Consumer Finance 
Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2017, p. A14, col. 1. Richard Cordray, the 
consumer-oriented director of the Bureau, was appointed by President Obama. 
He resigned shortly after Congress rejected the arbitration rule, months before the 
expiration of his five year Term. President Trump has appointed a much more 
business-friendly successor. See Stacey Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
Richard Cordray’s Exit From Consumer Bureau Gives Trump an Opening, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/business/cordray-
consumer-protection.html [https://perma.cc/LW8J-N8P3]. See generally Ronald 
L. Rubin, Cordray’s Choice, To Save the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
its Director Must Resign, NAT’L REV. (March 17, 2017), http://www.nationalreview 
.com/article/445758/richard-cordray-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-direct  
or-must-resign (arguing that the CFPB’s Director’s partisanship encourages the 
Republican Party to dismantle the CFPB, and perhaps the way to save it is to change 
leadership) [https://perma.cc/Y5WF-HKFX]. 
 122. Ernst & Young v. Morris, 137 S. Ct. 909 (2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
809 (2017). The courts of appeal are divided on this issue. Compare Morris v. Ernst 
& Young, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (determining that a concerted action waiver 
violates the NLRA), and Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (determining that an agreement barring 
collective arbitration violates the NLRA), with In re LogistiCare Solutions, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 866 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 2017); Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 
1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (enforcing an arbitration 
clause); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing the 
NLRB’s decision invalidating a class action waiver); and Owen v. Bristol Care, 
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (enforcing a class action waiver). See Costello, 
supra note 106 (discussing the federal circuit court split on the validity of class 
action waiver provisions and the implications of that division). 
 123. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 82-189, 65 Stat. 601 (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). Courts occasionally have declined to enforce 
arbitration clauses when the process suffered from structural or procedural 
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efforts by certain federal agencies, such as the regulation of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding nursing 
homes (which is also under attack),124 to limit mandatory no-class 
arbitration clauses in contracts within their jurisdiction or to use their 
administrative enforcement powers to secure victim-specific relief when 
there is a statutory basis for doing so125 may prove more successful—
again, if they survive. Unfortunately, at best these provisions only provide 
a piecemeal and limited amelioration of the effect of the two Supreme 
Court decisions. 
There also is the possibility that state attorneys general, using their 
parens patriae power, or private individuals acting on behalf of the state, 
might bring suit under the rubric of protecting the community’s health, 
                                                                                                             
infirmities. See, e.g., Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Mkts, Inc., 840 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 
2016) (finding the arbitrator misrepresented that he was a licensed attorney); 
Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding a failure to 
provide “an impartial decision maker”). Judicial scrutiny of such matters may not 
be as intense as it once was, however. 
 124. 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1)(2), at 524 (2016) (barring the entry into pre-
dispute arbitration agreements or requesting that a patient sign one as a condition 
of admission to a facility). The regulation has been challenged in courts in a 
number of states by nursing home groups, some of which have succeeded in 
securing an injunction against it taking effect. The Center for Medicare Services 
and the Justice Department were working on appeals at the end of President 
Obama’s administration, but the current Department apparently has abandoned 
that effort, leaving an injunction in force. In a parallel case, Am. Health Care 
Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2017), against the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
to declare the rule barring entering into pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
unlawful, the district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the rule’s 
enforcement. An appeal was dismissed by Thomas Price, who was then President 
Trump’s appointee as Secretary of HHS. See generally Robert Pear, Trump Moves 
to Impede Consumer Lawsuits Against Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/us/politics/trump-impedes-consumer-lawsuits 
-against-nursing-homes-deregulation.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5SNE-XY93].  
 125. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 
(2002) (determining that an arbitration clause does not prevent the EEOC from 
seeking back pay, reinstatement, and damages in an ADA enforcement action). 
Courts also have recognized that waivers are unenforceable when there is a 
“contrary congressional command.” See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, 
L.L.C., 745 F.3d 1326, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that no such 
“command” can be found in the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Smallwood v. 
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding foreign arbitration 
clauses are precluded by the Carmack Amendment). 
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welfare, and safety.126 Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this 
approach is the group of parallel actions by various state attorneys general 
against the tobacco industry seeking reimbursement for the states’ 
increased medical expenses resulting from treating ailments caused by 
smoking.127 That collective approach led to a settlement with all the states 
of over $200 billion.128 
Neither the state nor a third party acting for the state is bound by an 
arbitration clause because they are not parties to the contract.129 And 
                                                                                                             
 126. The state must have its own interest in the litigation that is independent 
from the claims of the individual citizens. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. 
Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Georgia ex rel. Hart v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
230 (1907). For example, the California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 
empowers an employee to bring an action on behalf of current or former 
employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. CAL. LABOR CODE 
§§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2017). The California Supreme Court has ruled that an 
action under the statute is not a class action. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., 
L.L.C., 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). 
 127. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997) 
(concluding that the state had authority to bring a common-law parens patriae 
action without statutory authority). See generally Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore 
Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the 
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000). 
 128. Ten states have settled their suits against Volkswagen for environmental 
damage caused by the company’s cheating on the emission control rules 
established by the states. The settlement amount is reported to be $157 million. 
See Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen to Pay 10 States Over Environmental Claims, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 30, 2017, at p. B3, col. 1. 
 129. Parens Patriae actions have been used in a variety of contexts, including 
consumer claims and mass torts. E.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico, 
458 U.S. 592 (1982) (determining that Puerto Rico could proceed in parens 
patriae to protect its economic interests from violations of federal law); Hawaii 
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (allowing the state to sue for 
antitrust violations in its proprietary capacity and on the basis of parens patriae 
on behalf of its citizens); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1901) (allowing suit 
based on a nuisance theory). See generally Edward Brunet, Improving Class 
Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1919 (2000); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 102, at 658–75 (arguing 
that state attorneys general should take leadership positions using private lawyers 
when needed); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: 
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) 
(discussing provisions empowering actions to recover money on behalf of 
citizens); Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police 
Power, 69 SMU L. REV. 759 (2016) (concluding that parens patriae litigation has 
its roots in the states’ police power). 
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because a parens patriae action is not a class action, the state has the 
additional advantages of not being subject to the often cumbersome 
prerequisites and procedures of Rule 23 and CAFA’s federalization of 
most class and mass actions.130 But the parens patriae possibility depends 
on whether a particular state has given its attorney general or private 
individuals acting on behalf of the state standing to bring such an action, 
whether the political climate in that state favors or discourages parens 
patriae actions and whether the attorney general has sufficient internal 
resources or is willing to retain experienced private attorneys to prosecute 
the action, as was done in the tobacco litigation. Parens patriae actions, 
however, often present other procedural difficulties and concerns.131 
Moreover, any defense interests that might be negatively affected by such 
an action most certainly would lobby against its institution. 
There is yet another departure from the courts worth noting. Following 
certain calamities, special private and governmentally sanctioned dispute 
resolution mechanisms have been established that in some respects are 
thought more efficient, cheaper, and less formal than the judicial process 
                                                                                                             
 130. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014). 
This case is extensively analyzed in Vairo, supra note 63, at 520–26. Also, these 
actions probably would not be affected by the possible enactment of the Fairness 
in Class Action Litigation Act described in note 66, supra. 
 131. Because it is not a class action, a parens patriae action would not be 
governed by the protective provisions prescribed by Rule 23, particularly those 
applicable to Rule 23(b)(3) actions, most notably a court determination of adequacy 
of representation, notice to all those potentially affected by the action, and the right 
to opt out. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, 
L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2016). The absence of these and other procedural 
protections raises concerns about such matters as the quality of the attorney 
general’s representation of the often divergent interests of the various people and 
entities in the state, the possibility of political or ideological conflicts of interest, the 
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of any settlement agreed to by the attorney 
general or her chosen surrogate, the propriety of any attorney’s fee arrangement or 
award if private counsel is employed, and whether every citizen or resident of the 
state is bound by the judgment or is free to bring an individual (or perhaps a class) 
action after the attorney general’s action is resolved. See Lemos, supra note 129 
(discussing these and other concerns about parens patriae actions). Problems also 
might arise when one or more private actions are proceeding at the same time as one 
or more parens patriae actions. See, e.g., California v. IntelliGender, L.L.C., 771 
F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining parens patriae proceeding banned by a prior 
settlement of class actions brought on behalf of California consumers). Perhaps 
parens patriae actions should be judicially treated as quasi-class actions. See 
discussion infra notes 155–162. At a minimum, the importance of judicial and 
citizen oversight of the proceeding and its aftermath should be recognized and 
assured by the court. 
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for compensating victims. Two exemplars of this approach are the 
statutory arrangement for claims arising out of the 9/11 terrorist attack on 
the Twin Towers in New York City132 and the fund established by British 
Petroleum following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico.133 Public and private arrangements like these replace the public 
court system and do not have most of the indicia of traditional civil 
litigation. The merits of these ad hoc mechanisms may be considerable, 
but they offer little to no transparency or assurance that all claimants will 
be treated equally and do not employ procedural and evidentiary rules or 
appellate judicial review comparable to those available in the public 
courts. But these concerns may just be academic quibbles. 
Specialist Kenneth R. Feinberg’s “rough justice” approach for the 
private resolution of related claims stands out.134 Of course, thus far there 
is only one Ken Feinberg who has a special genius and boundless energy 
for handling matters of this type.135 Realistically, these arrangements are 
                                                                                                             
 132. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 230 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). See generally LLOYD DIXON & 
RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION 
FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS (2004), http://www.rand.org 
/publications/MG/MG264/ [https://perma.cc/M7WB-4VQB]; Peter Schuck, 
Special Dispensation, AM. LAW., June 1, 2004, at 69–71; Anthony J. Sebok, What's 
Law Got to Do With It? Designing Compensation Schemes in the Shadow of the 
Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501, 517 (2003). 
 133. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 401 (2014). See generally John S. Backer, Jr., The BP Gulf Oil Spill Class 
Settlement: Redistributive “Justice”?, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 287 (2015) 
(questioning the settlement); Catherine M. Sharkey, The BP Oil Spill Settlement, 
Classwide Punitive Damages, and Societal Deterrence, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 681 
(2015) (discussing criticisms of the settlement). 
 134. In addition to 9/11 and BP, Ken has been appointed to administer such 
matters as the Boston Marathon bombing, the Penn State sex-abuse scandal, and the 
shootings in the Orlando, Florida Pulse nightclub. In Samuel Issacharoff & D. 
Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 
74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014), the authors demonstrate that despite the lower 
transaction costs, speed, and informality achieved by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility 
established by BP, the payments made pursuant to the settlement of the class action 
that replaced it were measurably higher. The authors theorize that for various 
reasons BP secured a greater degree of finality from the class action and was willing 
to pay a “peace premium” for a global resolution. They conclude that both sides did 
better in the public system. Id. at 412; see also D. Theodore Rave, Governing the 
Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–98 (2013). 
 135. Another gifted practitioner of this art is Professor Francis E. McGovern of 
Duke Law School, who has served as a special master in several high-profile 
disputes, including asbestos and hazardous waste cleanup cases, and various mass 
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one-off departures from the public court system that will be created only 
in a limited number of special circumstances. They are motivated by an 
understandable desire for consistency in result, expeditious handling of 
claims arising from particular events that cry out for special treatment, 
procedural informality, and claimant privacy. These are things dispersed 
individual lawsuits cannot guarantee. Although these private arrangements 
are infrequent and have a contained scope, they represent another 
manifestation of the “outsourcing” of the resolution of civil claims that 
normally would fall within the ambit of the public courts and at some level 
reflect a lack of confidence in the judicial process.136 
III. RELATED RELEVANT PROCEDURAL PHENOMENA 
To appraise the current state of civil litigation in the United States, 
particularly in the federal courts, it is important to consider other 
procedural phenomena that neither Judge Rubin nor I could have foreseen 
when we were young professionals, but today are major aspects of the civil 
litigation panorama. What follows focuses on two of them—multidistrict 
litigation and case management. Both are integrally related to the procedural 
developments discussed earlier. 
A. Multidistrict Litigation 
The first of these had its genesis in 1968 when Congress created the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,137 a special tribunal of seven 
federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice empowered to transfer all 
cases in the federal courts “involving one or more common questions of 
                                                                                                             
tort matters, such as the Station nightclub fire in West Warwick, Rhode Island. See 
Faculty Profile, Professor Francis E. McGovern, DUKE, https://law.duke.edu 
/fac/mcgovern/ [https://perma.cc/SYH7-F84W].  
 136. The ongoing quest for ways of resolving mass claims without endless 
litigation in the courts includes resort to aggregation through bankruptcy. See 11 
U.S.C. § 524(g). See generally Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of 
Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839 (2013). 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The background that led to the enactment of the statute 
is set forth in Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust 
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964). See generally 15 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD 
D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED 
MATTERS §§ 3861–3868 (4th ed. 2013); Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: 
The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017); Jaime 
Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass Multidistrict 
Litigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329 (2014). 
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fact” to a single district judge “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.” The statute was an early response to the emerging problem 
of handling what was then called “The Big Case.” 
The consolidation of dispersed but related cases for group pretrial 
processing under the governance of a single judge has become an increasingly 
ubiquitous feature of federal litigation and now has counterparts in a number 
of states.138 It is a reflection of the quest for efficiency, economy, and 
consistent treatment of related claims. Multi-district-litigation (“MDL”) 
practice under the statute, which has now been with us for 50 years, has 
become transformative. Indeed, it is fair to say it has become a mega-
phenomenon. Excluding pro se cases, it is estimated that close to 40% of 
the civil cases in the federal courts are part of an MDL.139 That statistic is 
truly stunning. Because class certification has become so difficult to secure 
and the process of seeking it freighted with so many burdens,140 there has 
been a pronounced shift by many lawyers to the MDL alternative for 
aggregating claims. As a result, the class action has been partially absorbed 
and replaced by MDL practice; it is not unusual for one or more class 
actions to be embedded in an MDL. 
The transferee judge has enormous control over the consolidated cases 
even though the statute requires, as the Supreme Court has held,141 that the 
                                                                                                             
 138. Among the state provisions most analogous to the federal statute are CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404–404.9 (West 2017) (authorizing coordination of cases 
sharing a common question of fact or law if it will promote the ends of justice); 
see 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.69–202.70(a)-(b) 
(enumerating the jurisdiction of the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court 
of the State of New York over 12 types of business actions); TEX. GOVT. Code 
ANN. § 74.161 (West 2017); TEX. RULES JUD. ADMIN. r. 13 (coordination of cases 
having one or more common questions). 
 139. See DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST 
PRACTICES x n.2 (2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicial 
studies/MDL_Standards_and_Best_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf (“In 2014, 
these MDL cases make up 36% of the civil case load.”) [https://perma.cc/PK9L-
BTBG]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies] (noting that from 
2002 to 2015 MDL proceedings “leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine percent” of the 
civil caseload). There was a decline in grants of consolidation petitions by the 
Panel in 2016. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR 
STATISTICS JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2016, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov 
/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2016.pdf (2017) [https://perma 
.cc/BG4Y-YEZK]. 
 140. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 141. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 
(1998) (concluding that the text of the MDL statute requires retransfer to the 
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individual litigation units must be returned to the Panel and then sent to 
the courts in which they originated when pretrial proceedings have been 
concluded. As a practical matter, however, the overwhelming majority of 
transferred cases are resolved by settlement, a pretrial dispositive motion 
before retransfer, or remain in place by consent, further empowering the 
transferee judge and the lawyers who control the MDL.142 “Work outs” are 
typically achieved, sometimes following carefully selected bellwether 
trials, such as in the In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation 
(pharmaceutical)143 and In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip 
Implant Products Liability Litigation (implant)144 matters. In the In re 
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products 
Liability Litigation (emissions),145 two significant settlements were 
                                                                                                             
Panel). Legislative attempts to overrule Lexecon to empower the transferee judge 
to retain and adjudicate the cases have failed. See, e.g., Multidistrict Litigation 
Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005); Multidistrict, 
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (the portion of the bill concerning Lexecon died in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, but the section dealing with mass disasters is now codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1369). See generally Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of 
Dispersed Litigation? Toward A Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation 
Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008) [hereinafter Marcus, Cure-
All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation]. 
 142. One prominent commentator on MDL litigation estimates “that just 2.9% 
of cases return to their original districts.” See Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139, 
at 72. Resolution in the transferee court by a judge who has become steeped in the 
dispute and its management may well be preferable to dispersing the consolidated 
individual units to numerous judges who are not familiar with the case or cases 
being transferred to him or her, which would subject them to variances in court 
dockets, delays, rules of procedure, and appellate review. All of these factors are 
likely to postpone the dispute’s overall resolution and produce significant 
differences in management and result. On the other hand, collective resolution in 
the transferee court may be at the expense of the individual autonomy, accuracy, 
and attention to the variousness of state laws and the circumstances of individual 
litigants. See discussion infra notes 151–162 and accompanying text. 
 143. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 144. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liab. 
Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011). The first bellwether trial resulted in 
a defense verdict; in the second, a jury awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages totaling approximately $500 million; the third led to a plaintiffs’ verdict 
of $502 million; the second and third verdicts are now in the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. A fourth bellwether trial is now in progress.  
 145. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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efficiently accomplished without any trial through the collaboration of the 
company, the plaintiffs’ steering committee, and the transferee judge.146 
State court actions are not covered by the federal statute, but the global 
settlement of an MDL proceeding often embraces the parallel state cases, 
even those that could not have been initiated in a federal court for 
jurisdictional reasons.147 Indeed, because defendants typically want to 
secure maximum preclusion and closure from a settlement, they often are 
willing to pay a “peace premium” if the settlement truly is global and 
embraces cases in both the federal and state courts.148 
MDL consolidation often affords individual plaintiffs and class 
members a forum for asserting claims that otherwise might have near-zero 
or negative litigation value, would languish indefinitely in various courts 
around the country, or yield inconsistent results if each claim had to be 
brought individually in separate federal and state courts. Furthermore, 
given today’s judicial attitudes, most mass and toxic tort matters probably 
could not be certified as class actions, especially when the class members’ 
rights are governed by the laws of multiple states.149 Those are all positive 
attributes of an MDL. But the implicit—and clear—culture of MDL 
transferee judges and lead counsel on both sides appears to have become 
the facilitation of settlement—as noted, preferably a global one embracing 
state cases.150 Indeed, settlement has become a dominant motif of MDL 
                                                                                                             
 146. No trials were held, presumably because liability was conceded. The 
settlement terms are quite favorable for the class members, in part because the 
company wants to put the unfortunate affair behind it. In contrast to the progress 
in this country, proceedings in Germany where Volkswagen clearly is “at home” 
are barely underway. Germany does not have a class action procedure comparable 
to Federal Rule 23. 
 147. See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to 
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 775, 793–98 (2010) (discussing a shift from using class action procedures to 
multidistrict-litigation procedures to manage and resolve tort litigation). 
 148. See generally Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 134; see also Rave, supra 
note 134, at 1192–98. 
 149. See supra note 58. Judge Rubin recognized at an early date that mass torts were 
a national—not a local—problem and called for a federal statute governing product and 
disaster litigation as well as proportionate liability when causation is unclear. Alvin B. 
Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429 (1986). 
 150. See generally RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF 
SETTLEMENT (2007); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent 
Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 
“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (“Oft-cited figures estimating settlement rates of 
between 85 and 95 percent are misleading; those figures represent all civil cases that 
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practice. This is an understandable aspect of today’s focus on litigation 
efficiency and economy and a manifestation of how lawyers and judges 
often seem to avoid merit determinations. 
I am not a troglodyte. I understand that “going to the merits” often is 
costly and risky. Like most observers I believe settlement usually is 
desirable, perhaps even to be prayed for. But I doubt it always should be 
an institutional driver. Remember, even assuming that the MDL process is 
efficient, reduces inconsistencies in result and treatment, achieves 
litigation peace, and federal judges apparently enjoy and take professional 
pride in managing and resolving these behemoths, consolidation does 
compromise the traditional right of individual plaintiffs to determine when 
to sue, choose a forum, be represented by a lawyer of his or her choice, 
and control or meaningfully participate in the process.151 
                                                                                                             
do not go to trial.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 
SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2008); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public 
Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009); Samuel Issacharoff & John 
Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of 
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); David Marcus, Some Realism 
About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949 (2008); Marcus, Cure-All for Dispersed 
Litigation, supra note 141, at 2288–89 (noting the settlement orientation); Francis 
E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809 
(2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2010); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for 
Resolving Complex Litigation of a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2205 (2008); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and 
Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 301 (2004); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems 
and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). 
 151. It has been argued that the understandable preoccupation with the 
efficiency of aggregation and achieving finality has obscured its negative effects 
on other systemic values. E.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013). Also, because multidistrict litigation involving 
hundreds or thousands of cases often is in the hands of repeat players, principal-
agent concerns have been raised about whether the interests of individual clients 
are being subordinated to the interests of those controlling the litigation. E.g., 
Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139 (offering suggestions for restoring 
competition); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players 
in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 
(2017); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: 
Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural 
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117–18, 128 (2015); Margaret S. Williams & 
Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to 
Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
424, 424 (2013); see also Abbie R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern 
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Consider the saga of someone with a small but reasonably meritorious 
grievance—perhaps one under a protective federal or state consumer or 
products statute—who consults a lawyer in Baton Rouge. Let us assume 
she is an accomplished practitioner but cannot take the case for economic 
reasons, a conflict of interest, some other commitment, or a lack of 
experience in the relevant substantive field. But to help someone who 
perhaps is a relative, neighbor, past client, or to pursue the public interest, 
she passes the matter along to an “aggregator,” perhaps a lawyer in or near 
New Orleans, who is developing an “inventory” of similar cases. When 
the aggregator brings that “inventory” to a federal court, either as an 
original action or by removal, it will be consolidated with similar cases 
and inventories by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel and sent to a 
transferee judge in a jurisdiction, possibly one (in a galaxy) far, far away. 
If our Baton Rouge lawyer and New Orleans aggregator are not part of the 
MDL elite of repeat players, and thus unlikely to be on the Plaintiffs’ 
Steering Committee, our hypothetical claimant has been consigned to a 
largely non-transparent distant world in which he and his counsel have 
little or no voice.152 It is legitimate to wonder whether, under certain 
                                                                                                             
Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017) (analyzing the unique aspects of MDL proceedings 
based on interviews with 20 judges). 
 152. There is some evidence that in certain cases there is a possibility of 
participation by individual class members or MDL claimants or their counsel 
previously thought not to be feasible. That apparently was and continues to be 
true in the NFL Concussions case, In re Nat’l Football Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016), for 
example. See Cabraser & Issacharoff, supra note 64 (discussing the emergence of 
active class member participation). See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Mark 
Herrmann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped 
Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008); Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS. 
451 (2012). In the NFL Concussions case, for example, District Judge Anita 
Brody held a post-settlement hearing regarding the distribution of benefits that 
players could attend by way of the Internet, Post-Settlement Hearing, In re Nat’l 
Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015), 
http://events7.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/8ad6d89e23e3487797b85b34a2f68
4c31d [https://perma.cc/XG28-TWHW]. The level of participation Cabraser and 
Issacharoff describe in cases like NFL Concussions and Volkswagen Emissions 
probably cannot be realized or be meaningful in small claim class actions and 
MDL proceedings. But the Internet undoubtedly provides an excellent medium 
for seeking the participation of people anywhere in the world in anticipated or 
commenced litigation as in those cases. See generally John Coffee, The 
Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture and Incentives, 165 U. 
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circumstances, the individual should be permitted to exit the consolidated 
proceeding as members of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are permitted to 
do.153 But would that undermine the aggregative value of the MDL 
procedure?154 
Some academics and practitioners have raised a concern about certain 
powers transferee judges occasionally assume. For example, in some cases 
they create what are termed “quasi-class actions,” as in In re Zyprexa 
Products Liability Litigation155 and In re World Trade Center Lower 
Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation,156 by asserting control over attorneys’ 
fees and appraising the quality of the private settlements the parties have 
                                                                                                             
PA. L. REV. 1895 (2017). The same medium is being used for transmitting 
settlement notices and facilitating aspects of the benefit distribution process. E.g., 
In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 153. See generally Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 151, at 681–87 
(discussing various advantages of recognizing some right of exit); Roger C. 
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An 
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 821–22 (1995) (referring to individuals 
in aggregate litigation as “kidnapped” riders). 
 154. The Supreme Court’s denial of personal jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers, 
supra notes 26–29, over nonresidents whose claims are not related to the 
defendant’s in-forum activities raises questions about a transferee court’s ability 
to adjudicate an MDL’s merits—as opposed to simply managing its pretrial 
proceedings—absent the parties’ consent with regard to those plaintiffs and 
defendants who do not have a jurisdictionally sufficient relationship with the 
transferee forum. It certainly suggests that the consent must be actual and not 
virtual. See Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 552 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2009). 
Some of these issues have been raised in connection with bellwether trials in a 
mandamus petition in In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant 
Products Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011). Since the decision 
in Bristol-Myers is constitutionally based, it is questionable whether even 
amending the MDL statute to authorize the transferee court’s adjudication of the 
merits, as has been periodically proposed, see supra note 141, could provide 
personal jurisdiction over the unaffiliated participants, although the argument for 
that result might be stronger with regard to those plaintiffs who file directly in the 
transferee forum or if the remark in the Bristol-Myers opinion about the possibility 
that a different constitutional personal jurisdiction standard exists for the federal 
courts—or at least in federal question cases—shows signs of vitality. See supra 
note 28 and accompanying text.  
 155. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. 
La. 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 
No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). 
 156. In re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 758 F.3d 
202 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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reached. The Multidistrict Litigation Act is silent on these matters. 
Moreover, these activities have been undertaken without explicit provision 
for protections comparable to those available in some or all Rule 23 class 
actions—adequacy of representation, notice, predominance, superiority, 
opt-out, and judicial approval of class counsel, attorneys’ fees, and 
settlement. None of these are provided for by the Act. 
Treating an MDL as a quasi-class action results in heightened control 
of the litigation by the transferee judge and diminished participation by 
those lawyers who are not among the lead counsel. Thus, some have 
wondered where the judicial authority to do it comes from.157 Perhaps it is 
a byproduct of a federal judge’s inherent or managerial power to appoint 
and compensate lead counsel and to protect the absentee claimants.158 Or 
perhaps it simply reflects some notion of necessity or a variation on the 
ancient equity maxim that regards “as done that which ought to be 
done.”159 Critics assert, however, that there is no judicial authority to 
second guess, let alone veto, what private parties have chosen to do in 
connection with a non-class action settlement.160 
Judicial involvement may well be desirable, however. Given the high 
settlement rate in class actions and MDL proceedings, there always have 
been concerns about whether the plaintiffs’ lead counsel actually 
negotiates for the best terms for their clients—particularly the absent 
                                                                                                             
 157. See generally Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: 
A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1014–23 
(2005) (rethinking the principles that animate class actions and rejecting the 
predominance test); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and 
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 
DUKE L.J. 381 (2000) (arguing ethical safeguards are not sufficient to ensure 
adequate representation); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-
Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Mullenix, Dubious 
Doctrines] (arguing that quasi-class actions do not resolve claims by giving full 
consideration to the interests of individual injured parties); Silver & Miller, supra 
note 150 (proposing an alternative method of MDL management to allow lawyers 
to design governance structures). 
 158. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on December 29, 
1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 
2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL 716190, 
at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb 24, 2010). 
 159. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 33 (Stanford Univ. Press 1967). 
 160. See generally Erichson, supra note 157 (arguing that the parties have not 
consented to judicial intervention); Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 157 
(arguing that quasi-class actions do not sufficiently consider the interests of individual 
injured parties); Silver & Miller, supra note 150 (proposing an alternative method of 
MDL management to allow lawyers to design governance structures). 
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claimants.161 To what extent might they, perhaps unintentionally, become 
distracted by self-interest? That could take the form of plaintiffs’ lead 
counsel foregoing pressing for additional monies or other remedies that 
could benefit the plaintiffs in exchange for the defendants’ cooperation 
regarding the attorneys’ fee that ultimately will be sought from the court. 
Thus, it is important that the presiding judge in class and other aggregated 
proceedings carefully scrutinize the behavior and performance of 
attorneys when they petition for fees and cost reimbursement, as well as 
the terms of every settlement, particularly regarding appraising the true 
value of what the claimants will receive. Unfortunately, in some cases 
certain settlement elements have been found to be of little or no value.162 
B. Judicial Management 
MDL practice exemplifies another transformation in our civil justice 
system: the birth, maturation, and pervasiveness of judicial management. 
This is one of the most significant procedural developments that has 
occurred during my professional life. It is one that has dramatically altered 
                                                                                                             
 161. See Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139, at 74–75 (“[S]elf-interest can 
take over if left unchecked, and no checks exist.”); Erickson, supra note 157; 
Christopher B. Mueller, Taking a Second Look at MDL Product Liability 
Settlements: Somebody Needs to Do It, 65 KAN. L. REV. 531 (2017) (questioning 
the legitimacy and processing of these settlements and suggesting the need for 
collateral review); Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 157. See generally 
Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class 
Action Settlements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (2016) (discussing the signs of 
a settlement that harms claimants and benefits their counsel and defendants); 
Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337; Silver & Miller, supra note 150, at 134 (suggesting that 
settlements should simply refer the question of fees to the court); Margaret S. 
Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in Federal 
Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141 (2012) (discussing the impact of 
generalist versus specialist plaintiff attorneys on the operation of multidistrict 
litigation proceedings). 
 162. See, e.g., In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (characterizing the settlement as “worthless”); 
see discussion infra notes 180–181; Pearson v. NBTY, 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 
2014) (finding a short-term product labelling change to be of no value to the 
class); Dennis v. Kellogg Corp., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (expressing concern 
that “self-interest” influenced the negotiation’s outcome). See generally Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015) 
(arguing fees should be awarded based on what benefits the lead lawyers actually 
achieve for the plaintiffs). 
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the respective roles of judges and lawyers in civil litigation. Management 
had its genesis in the unique and effective handling of a massive cluster of 
related antitrust cases by a group of federal judges specially appointed by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s. That resulted in attention being 
focused on the “problem” of what was then called “The Big Case” and led 
to the 1968 enactment of the Multidistrict Litigation Act, the publication 
of the quasi-official Manual for Complex Litigation, the explicit validation 
of judicial management in the complete revision of Federal Rule 16 in 
1983, and the simultaneous expansion of judicial control over the 
discovery process. 
Perhaps a mea culpa is in order. I was a co-conspirator in these 
developments because I worked with the judicial authors of the Manual, 
drafted part of it, and was the Reporter for the Federal Rules Advisory 
Committee that proposed the 1983 Federal Rule amendments that 
validated and encouraged judicial management. So, it was on my watch 
that Rule 16 was transformed from a simplistic and largely useless eve-of-
trial pretrial conference into an elaborate management menu envisioning 
multiple pretrial conferences and orders—replete with sanctions for 
noncompliance with its dictates.163 And it was on my watch that the core 
discovery rule, Federal Rule 26, was amended to promote the judicial 
monitoring of discovery to avoid it becoming redundant or disproportionate.164 
Other than a few experiments after the Second World War, judicial 
management prior to these developments was virtually non-existent. It was 
not thought to be a proper “judicial” function to be a participant in the 
                                                                                                             
 163. See generally 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY 
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1521–1531 (3d ed. 2010). 
Rule 16 was amended again in 1993 to enhance certain aspects of judicial 
management and to refer—and thereby encourage resort to—alternative dispute 
resolution. A number of states have parallel provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 575 (West 2017); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.602 (2017); MINN. R. CIV. P. 1601 (2017). 
 164. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. 
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2010). My 
contemporary thoughts about the 1983 amendments are summarized in ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Education and Training Series 
1984). I testified against the 2015 amendment to Rule 26 regarding discovery 
proportionality because in my view it transformed the 1983 recognition of judicial 
discretion to limit discovery if it proved to be excessive into something that can 
be applied as a premature precondition on discovery, which I hope does not come 
to pass. Statement of Arthur R. Miller Before the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, Phoenix, Ariz. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/fr_import/ST2015-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T3P-HZWN]. See supra note 78. 
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processing of a case rather than simply acting as an umpire regarding the 
litigation decisions made by the attorneys. Many district judges even 
believed that involvement in the settlement process was particularly 
inappropriate. Indeed, when I appeared at various judicial conferences and 
training sessions to discuss management and the import of the 1983 
Federal Rule amendments, I encountered a fair amount of hostility to the 
concept from many judges. That change in their job description was 
extremely controversial.165 Today it is taken for granted that management 
is part of what judges do and lawyers treat judicial involvement and 
participation as quite normative. 
It probably is true that the contemporary commitment to judicial 
management, especially when linked to the increased importance of 
summary judgment, heightened settlement pressures, and the 
omnipresence of highly complex multi-party, multi-claim cases, promotes 
efficiency and case disposition—laudable goals in the abstract and 
certainly the motivation for much of what has happened in recent decades. 
But one might ask: is the quest for “efficiency” through management, 
“gatekeeping,” and promoting pretrial disposition being achieved at the 
expense of other values long thought central to the goals of our civil justice 
system? Should management and gatekeeping trump and replace merit 
adjudication? To what extent has management reordered the relationship 
between the court and counsel, particularly in class actions and MDL 
proceedings, perhaps eroding elements of the “adversary” system? And if 
that is true, is that good or bad one might ask. Are many of our federal and 
state judges increasingly becoming managers rather than adjudicators? 
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed 
concern that our courts have taken on the trappings of administrative 
                                                                                                             
 165. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378–80 
(1982). Professor Resnik expressed concern about the potential for judges to abuse 
their discretionary power under a case management regime. Other scholars believe 
the rewards of management outweigh its risks. See Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-
A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984) (critiquing Professor 
Resnik’s concerns and arguing that judicial management is beneficial). See 
generally 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163; Miller, Pretrial Rush to 
Judgment, supra note 82, at 1003–07; Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, 
supra note 34, at 54–57. Congress joined the management bandwagon when it 
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012), now 
largely sunset, which called upon each district court to develop an expense and delay 
plan that included considering using “litigation management.” 
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agencies and wonders how the activities of agencies can be distinguished 
from those of courts.166 
IV. WHY HAS ALL OF THIS HAPPENED? 
Many reasons are advanced. The cost, delay, and risks of contemporary 
litigation are popular explanations.167 These concerns certainly make the 
pressure for enhancing the efficiency and economy of litigation and the 
desire to separate and terminate litigation chaff as early as possible 
understandable. But those reasonable objectives do not necessarily explain 
or justify all that has transpired. Two related explanations that reflect the 
political and social realities of the times we live in suggest themselves. 
First, I do not think it is unfair to say that a number of the Justices on the 
current Supreme Court as well as other judges have a predilection, perhaps 
subliminal, that favors business and governmental interests.168 A number 
                                                                                                             
 166. Patrick Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District 
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745 (2010); see also the references infra note 169. 
 167. There is a fair amount of data indicating that the civil system is 
performing considerably better than the negative suppose “common wisdom” 
suggests. See generally STEVEN P. CROWLEY, CIVIL JUSTICE RECONSIDERED 93–
116 (2017); Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice 
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012) [hereinafter 
Reda, Cost-and-Delay Narrative]. The available empirical evidence, for example, 
suggests that litigation costs are tied to litigation stakes and may not be exorbitant 
when viewed from that perspective. See Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, 
supra note 34, at 61–71; Reda, Cost-and-Delay Narrative, supra, at 1111–32; see 
also THOMAS E. WILLGING, DONNA STIENSTRA, JOHN SHAPARD & DEAN MILFICH, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN 
CLOSED CIVIL CASES 52 (1997); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra & John 
Shapard, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998). My mentor who served as 
the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the 1960s expressed the 
view on the Federal Rules’ 50th Anniversary that they were working well. He noted 
that they supported “revolutions in the substantive law” and asserted that “the much-
criticized discovery function and class action remain together the scourge of 
corporate and governmental malefactors.” Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1879, 1891 (1989). Of course, that comment was made before most of the 
procedural retrenchment I described earlier occurred.  
 168. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT, THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (examining 
conservative challenges to legal liberalism); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1431, 1470–73 (2013) (concluding that business is favored by the Roberts Court); 
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of judicial opinions in recent years, such as some I have referred to, show 
that orientation. Second, I think it is fair to say that some Justices and other 
judges are disenchanted with civil litigation for various reasons.169 
Sensing that shift in judicial attitude and reacting to the difficulties, 
costs, and risks of today’s large-scale civil litigation, especially the 
possibility of going to trial before a jury, certain conservative and pro-
business political and defense interests have been energetically waging an 
anti-litigation war for many years to limit resort to the courts and to affect 
what happens in them.170 Segments of both the business and legal worlds 
                                                                                                             
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules 
and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
1731 (2014) (reaching the same conclusion); Wasserman, supra note 90 
(asserting that the Roberts Court has reshaped the rules of civil procedure to 
the benefit of business interests). A similar attitude has been manifested in 
Congress, accounting for the enactment of such business-oriented procedural 
legislation as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
105-67, 109 Stat. 737 the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105353 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012). It also explains the speed with which the 
proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. 
(2017), described supra note 66, went through the House of Representatives 
without any meaningful scrutiny. 
 169. The growth of court caseloads in many parts of the country, the expansion 
and complexity of substantive law, and the bureaucratization of the federal 
judiciary should not be ignored as factors contributing to today’s preoccupation 
with efficiency and gatekeeping. See generally Owen N. Fiss, The 
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1982) (looking at the 
transformation of the judiciary into a large-scale organization); Diarmuid F. 
O’Scannlain, Access to Justice within the Federal Courts—A Ninth Circuit 
Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033 (2012) (a distinguished federal judge describing 
the limited capacity and resources of the federal courts); Judith Resnik, The 
Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered 
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998) (noting the emergence of an 
administrative judiciary). 
 170. The political aspects of the anti-litigation war, which the authors refer to 
as the counterrevolution to the growth of the Litigation State, is chronicled in 
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 11, at 16–62. 
The current judicial love affair with arbitration is evidence of that 
disenchantment. The pro-arbitration movement is recounted in Gilles, The Day 
Doctrine Died, supra note 99; see also Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, 
supra note 77, at 322–31 & nn.135–69 (explaining the growth of, and the Supreme 
Court’s support for, arbitration). See generally Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, 
supra note 99; Siegel, supra note 90 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was 
consistently motivated by its mistrust of civil litigation). The class-action has 
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have engaged in a strident and rather successful campaign against the class 
action—indeed, against litigation in general—both in the courts and in the 
public arena that undoubtedly has affected politicians, public perception, 
and perhaps some judges. Indeed, in addition to being instrumental in 
causing the procedural retrenchment and erection of stop signs I described 
earlier and motivating numerous constrictions of substantive law, the 
campaign has influenced who is elected and appointed as judges in various 
parts of the country.171 Not surprisingly, it has dampened the willingness 
of some members of the plaintiffs’ bar to undertake risky, even potentially 
meritorious, cases.172 
The defense bar and its clients have devoted extraordinary resources 
to these endeavors that cannot be matched by those on the plaintiffs’ side, 
which historically has not been able to organize itself effectively—
although it seems to be doing better of late—and is divided philosophically 
along entrepreneurial and public interest lines. The anti-litigation forces 
have played on the distrust many Americans have of lawyers, particularly 
                                                                                                             
been a primary target of defense interests in the anti-litigation war. See Stephen 
B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against 
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017). 
 171. See generally Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the 
Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize 
the Judiciary (Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
RWP15-001, 2015), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers 
/Index. (noting that although lawyers tend to be liberal, judges tend to be 
conservative, arguing that the disparity reflects the politicization of the judiciary) 
[https://perma.cc/7U39-MCGS]. See, e.g., SCOTT GREYTAK, ALICIA BANNON, 
ALLYSE FALCE, LINDA CASEY & LAURA KINNEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–14 
(2015), http://newpoliticsreport.org/report/2013-14/ [https://perma.cc/SQ43-TD4X]. 
Conservative Justices on the Supreme Court have been found to have a lower pro-
private enforcement voting rate than liberal Justices, supporting the notion that “the 
long decline in pro-private enforcement outcomes has been driven by the votes of 
conservative justices.” BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra 
note 11, at 115. 
 172. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHAKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & 
ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE CASES POLITICAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Brookings Inst. Press 2006) (claiming that the political 
convictions of judges affect their decisions in cases when the law does not provide 
a clear answer); TELES, supra note 168 (charting the development of the 
conservative legal movement from the 1970s); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive 
Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 755, 756–57, 772–83 (2016) (describing and debunking the “decades-long 
anti-litigation lobbying effort” that is “designed to convince all of us that litigation 
is pathologically abusive”). 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers;173 characterized lawsuits as abusive, frivolous, and 
extortionate; and painted class actions as “lawyer’s cases” that award class 
attorneys millions of dollars in fees but give individual class members only 
pennies or a few dollars—conveniently ignoring the cumulative value of 
the class’s recovery. In addition, they claim that lawsuits impose a 
“litigation tax” on Americans and impair the competitiveness of American 
businesses in the global marketplace.174  
The anti-litigation war has become a political issue and has had 
significant consequences. Populist judiciaries in several states have been 
voted out and replaced.175 The campaign has been augmented—
inadvertently, I suspect—by rather one-sided media attention, which often 
repeats dubious horror stories, embraces the defense portrayal of litigation, 
and often depicts the plaintiffs’ bar in negative terms.176 
                                                                                                             
 173. See generally Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 90 
(discussing President Reagan’s public hostility towards public interest lawyers who 
he characterized as “‘a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own 
thing at the expense of the . . . poor who actually need help’ and as ‘working for 
left-wing special interest groups at the expense of the public’”); Eric D. Green, What 
Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 
Into the Twenty-first Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1997) (“[F]rom the 
defendants’ perspective, class actions are the ultimate weapon of legal terrorism, 
launched by litigation-mad, bottom-feeding, money-hungry, professional plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: 
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 450 (2004) 
(people have “fulminated against the bar as . . . plagues of ‘locusts’”). 
 174. See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). Nonetheless, there probably is a consensus for the 
proposition that a significant portion of the inefficiencies, delays, and high costs 
of contemporary litigation is a result of lawyer behavior that produces 
unnecessary or avoidable proceedings resulting from lawyering styles, habits, 
hourly billing practices, and professional competition. See generally Marrero, 
supra note 88 (arguing that the procedural rules are not at fault; rather it is how 
the rules are practiced). 
 175. Just by way of example, between 2000 and 2009 Alabama had the highest 
campaign spending on judicial races of any state. The Alabama Supreme Court 
went from being entirely composed of Democrats in 1994 to completely 
Republican in 2004. See JOHN F. KOWAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL 
SELECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org 
/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial_Selection_21st_Century.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4NZF-Z3RN]; see also id. at 12 (“[J]udges increasingly face the threat of 
electoral retribution when they rule in ways that offend powerful interests.”). 
 176. KOWAL, supra note 175, at 10 (“In the 2013-2014 election cycle, outside 
spending by interest groups, including political action committees and social 
welfare organizations, accounted for nearly 30 percent of total spending, nearly 
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The effects of this anti-litigation campaign and demonization of 
lawyers works against those in the lower and middle economic classes who 
are most in need of meaningful entre to the civil justice system.177 That is 
an unfortunate echo of today’s much discussed societal inequities 
reflecting the stunning disparity in political and economic power, income, 
and status in our nation. It has led some to argue that to a very significant 
degree the existing federal rulemaking structure, Supreme Court practice, 
and high-stakes litigation are dominated by an elite segment of the legal 
profession and the major entities they represent, enabling them to pursue 
an agenda that has led to the distortion of the civil justice system’s 
procedure and has disadvantaged the people actually involved in the vast 
majority of cases in our courts.178 Whatever the merit of these points, the 
                                                                                                             
doubling the record share, pre-Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, [558 
U.S. 310 (2010)] of 16 percent in 2003-04 . . . from 1994 to 2014, spending on 
judicial races exceeded $420 million. Much of that staggering sum went to fund 
television advertising.”). See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, 
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 39 (2004); 
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The 
Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293 
(2016); Mark Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the 
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Thornburg, supra note 172, at 
772–83. A textbook illustration is the media coverage of the so-called 
McDonald’s coffee spill case, which consistently understated the gravity of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries and her modest claim for relief, overstated the size of her 
recovery, and never really reported the nature of the defendant’s fault. See Liebeck 
v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994), 
vacated by agreement, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994). Seven years 
after the case ended HBO aired a documentary entitled Hot Coffee that finally put 
the matter in proper prospective. HOT COFFEE (The Group Entertainment 2011). 
 177. Some scholars have expressed concern that the various procedural 
restraints I have discussed have marginalized some people and social out-groups. 
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 504 
(2012) (arguing that procedural limits on court access harm society by keeping 
marginalized plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious civil rights claims); Spencer, The 
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, supra note 90, at 361–62, 366–70 (“Civil 
procedure tends to . . . protect[] commercial defendants against claims by members 
of various out-groups.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1005, 1050 (2015) (“As with politics and economics, a one percent regime [of 
procedure]—while good for the one percent—leaves the great ninety-nine percent 
far behind.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking 
and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015) 
(discussing the role of rulemaking in litigation reform, focusing on the 
backgrounds of the Advisory Committee members and the then-proposed 
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fact is that all of the procedural stop signs I described earlier179 inhibit 
access, promote pretrial termination, and avoid full merit adjudication 
across the litigation spectrum. Analogous charges, of course, can be 
levelled at the consequences of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
mandatory one-by-one arbitration clauses. 
But let me try not to fall prey to the fallacy of the black and the white. 
I have to acknowledge that there have been some marginal—and some 
might even be called silly or frivolous—lawsuits that receive considerable 
attention and contribute to the negative imagery projected by defense 
interests and the media. Everyone has his or her favorite. Mine is a recent 
unfair trade practices class action under a state consumer protection statute 
providing for an attorney fee award against the fast food company Subway 
that advertises “foot-long” sandwiches. Occasionally, the plaintiff 
asserted, the sandwiches turn out to be only 11 or 11.5 inches long. The 
company insisted its sandwiches have the same food and nutritional 
content as those in the advertisements. Even if the case had factual merit 
and some potential for promoting compliance with consumer protection 
laws, the optics are bad. As it turned out, most of the sandwiches tested 
actually were 12 inches long and when they were less than that the 
shortage usually was only one-fourth of an inch. The class settled for about 
$525,000, which went to the lawyers less the $500 given to each of the ten 
named plaintiffs.180 The district court’s approval of the settlement was 
reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that it enriched only the 
lawyers and class representatives; the benefits to the other class members 
were characterized as “worthless.”181 
                                                                                                             
amendments approved for consideration by the Judicial Conference’s Standing 
Committee on Practice and Procedure); John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. 
McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 26 (2012) 
(referring to a survey finding that “[a] substantial group of local plaintiffs’ counsel 
resent the [Multidistrict Litigation] panel’s role in facilitating national plaintiffs’ 
counsels’ ‘takeover’ of their cases.”). Judge Heyburn and Professor McGovern 
criticize the “repeat-player syndrome in the selection of plaintiffs’ MDL counsel.” 
Id. at 30. Multidistrict Litigation is discussed supra notes 137–162. 
 179. See discussion supra Part II. 
 180. In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 316 
F.R.D. 240 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d, 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Eric 
Goldman, Why The Subway ‘Footlong’ Lawsuits Fell Short, FORBES (2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/02/29/why-the-subway-footlong- 
lawsuits-fell-short/#261aac6869f2 [https://perma.cc/H5V8-PEU6]. 
 181. In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 869 
F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017). 
2018] WHAT ARE COURTS FOR? 803 
 
 
 
Less “newsworthy” cases that perform a more significant policy-
enforcing function rarely are given comparable media attention.182 Having 
spent many years dabbling in television, I understand that the “foot-long” 
story is one that is easy and “catchy” to tell and pictorialize. Moreover, 
realistically a newspaper reporter allotted only a few inches to tell her story 
or a television reporter with 30 or 45 seconds of airtime cannot be expected 
to include a lecture on the societal values of deterring wrongdoing, the 
importance of truth in advertising, or an explanation of the risks of 
contingent fee representation. 
The “foot-long” lawsuit and others like it raise the basic question I 
asked at the outset: what are courts for? What is a “real case”? To me, a 
case that helps effectuate a statutory or judicially established policy 
prohibiting unfair trade practices or advertising misrepresentations is a 
“real” case, regardless of the gravity of the individual’s injury, the 
monetary stakes, or whether the lawyer’s motivation is an attorney’s fee 
or a societal good.183 But I recognize that people have disparate views on 
the utility of using limited public resources—the courts—to litigate about 
practices and products that have not caused any palpable injury to some or 
most of the victims of deleterious behavior, and some critics deplore the 
possibility of overcompensation and over-deterrence.184  
The questions and choices are easily stated. Should the system 
exercise itself over “trivial” regulatory violations involving such things as 
data breaches, advertising, labelling, or packaging, and a host of other 
business practices that the law considers actionable under tort, contract, or 
                                                                                                             
 182. See BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 11, 
at 225 (demonstrating that the media coverage of Supreme Court rulings on the 
private enforcement of rights is less than the coverage on decisions concerning 
the rights themselves, “helping to forestall public perceptions that justices are 
legislators in black robes”). 
 183. In class I sometimes teasingly analogize giving people a new substantive 
right to giving someone a Ferrari. It may be a wondrous gift, but it has no value if 
the recipient cannot afford gasoline. Analogously, it is the availability of an 
attorney and incentivizing him or her with the prospect of a fee award, as well as 
the availability of a functional aggregation procedure, that will fuel the 
substantive right and make it meaningful. Without that, the right will remain 
largely unused. 
 184. Occasionally, a note of judicial frustration is sounded. “This is another of 
the surprisingly many junk-fax suits under . . . the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act.” Chapman v. All Am. Painting, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(Easterbrook, C.J.). See generally Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 45, 
at 520–30. 
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warranty theories?185 Or should the system metaphorically close its eyes 
in the name of husbanding its limited resources for more “significant” 
matters? Do we think the answer is to leave these defalcations to the 
regulators, who we know are under-resourced and tend to be captured by 
those they supposedly regulate? Or should Americans just grin and bear 
deceptive economic practices and emotional slights? 
V. SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
When I think of today’s penchant for early termination, the ubiquitous 
federal court judicial management dynamic and its osmosis into a number 
of state court systems, the movement out of the public court system into 
private dispute resolution in the form of mandatory contractual arbitration, 
mediation, Feinbergization, and related trends including mandatory 
disclosure, bellwether trials, and the pervasive work-out and settlement 
mentality in the bench and bar, it seems to me that a significant erosion of 
the merit-determination orientation of our civil system and the aspirations 
of the procedural Gold Standard have taken place. I never thought I would 
hear a federal district judge say to me that “if any case on my docket 
reaches trial, I have failed.” But I have. Also, I have no doubt that many 
of the changes I have described, particularly the procedural retrenchment 
                                                                                                             
 185. Recently, so-called “slack-fill” lawsuits have appeared claiming consumer 
injury when food packages are under-filled, giving the appearance that purchasers are 
getting more product than they actually are. See, e.g., In re McCormick & Co., Inc. 
Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 215 F. Supp. 3d 51 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(holding that a competitor’s claim under the Lanham Act and for violations of state 
deceptive trade practices for slack-filled black pepper packaging was sufficiently 
stated); Paul Zibro, McCormick Seeks to Dismiss “Slack Fill” Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. 
(July 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles /mccormick-seeks-to-dismiss-slack-
fill-lawsuit-1437164034 [https://perma.cc/85 8U-R4RV]. Do these actions keep food 
companies honest or are they frivolous nuisance suits? These and other cases of this 
type, such as the Subway “foot-long” case, typically pose serious questions regarding 
the ascertainability of the class members—who purchased the challenged product or 
whose files were hacked? See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 
2012); Oshana v. Coca Cola Co., 472 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 2006). Most of the cases die 
an early death. See, e.g., Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming 
the grant of a motion to dismiss because plaintiff could not plausibly allege that the 
product’s design and packaging were deceptive when the correct weight was stated). 
See generally Joyce Hanson, Slack-Fill Suits Boom Despite Few Class Wins, LAW360 
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/912004/ [https://perma.cc /69AK-
FMT7]. The proposed Fairness in Class Actions Act discussed in note 66, supra, 
would burden the processing of these “personal injury” claims in significant ways, 
including by insisting on ascertainability of class members at certification.  
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and “national policy” favoring arbitration, have contributed to what we 
now characterize as the “vanishing” trial and the demise of our 
commitment to the civil jury that many bemoan.186 In parts of the country, 
our federal judges, to put it simply, have less and less “bench presence.”187 
The phenomena I have been discussing seem to be progressing as my 
television mentor, the late Fred Friendly, used to say—in a stealth-like 
“one-degree-it-is” fashion. Does anyone other than those benefitting or 
being burdened by the systemic changes notice or care about them? Is the 
ongoing procedural retrenchment and the flight from the courts positive or 
negative? Is arbitration speedier, more economic and “juster” than 
adjudication in the courts? Is management for trial more or less efficient 
than erecting stop signs and managing for settlement? Although system 
participants and observers have visceral feelings and a range of viewpoints, 
I submit we do not really know—and may never know—the answers to 
these questions. I have a feeling we are proceeding largely in the dark. 
Shouldn’t we worry about that? Shouldn’t we insist on some enlightenment, 
perhaps in the nature of a cost-benefit analysis comparing the “value” of 
procedural stop signs, MDLs, and judicial management versus more robust 
and efficient merit adjudication as well as an analysis of the competing 
“values” of the public and private systems? But who would we trust to do 
that analysis and would we believe whatever conclusions were offered? 
The means for diverting cases away from an adjudication of their merits 
have greatly expanded in past decades. Many of the justifications for the 
procedural changes I have described are based on assumptions about the 
litigation world. They are not based on reliable evidence, and many of 
them are well-worn clichés peddled by interest groups who would prefer 
                                                                                                             
 186. Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts has been a leading 
crusader on this subject. See, e.g., United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
21–27 (D. Mass. 2011) (arguing in an addendum to his opinion against an 
“administrative model” of the courts); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, 
Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (“[T]he 
civil jury trial has all but disappeared.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Joseph F. 
Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s Lament over 
the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010) (discussing 
“the vanishing jury trial”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination 
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & 
LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil 
Trials in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (arguing that our 
system should be termed “nontrial procedure”). 
 187. See Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An 
Updated Look at Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565 
(2014) (discussing judges’ declining courtroom hours and the resulting consequences, 
such as reduced accuracy, fairness, and effectiveness of court services). 
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to close courthouse doors, countered by those trying to keep them open. 
One thing is clear: The pretrial process is now littered with procedural 
detours and stop signs that did not exist when Alvin and I were youngsters. 
Do we really know what they are accomplishing? 
Perhaps it is naïve or too academic of me to suggest that maybe we 
should just start over, wipe the slate clean, and invent a new civil 
procedure system as we did in 1938.188 Easier said than done, of course. A 
drastic reevaluation might mean that the existing Federal Rules, the Rules 
Enabling Act,189 the Arbitration Act, and the Multidistrict Litigation Act 
would have to be rethought and might go under the legislative knife, or at 
least be reorganized. Similarly, our questionable commitment to procedural 
trans-substantivity might have to be interred; one set of universal court 
procedures regardless of substantive context, a worthy objective of the 
comparatively simple litigation world of the 1930s, probably does not make 
sense in the 2020s:190 “One size does not fit all.”191 Segregating cases and 
                                                                                                             
 188. There are scholars who believe that the third iteration of American 
procedure—common law, code, and Federal Rule—has ended and opine that we 
already are in a fourth era that focuses on judicial management, mediation, arbitration, 
and efficiency, and less on merit adjudication. See Subrin & Main, supra note 90. 
Despite my lifetime commitment to the Gold Standard, I fear they are right. 
 189. Arguably decisions such as Twombly, Iqbal, and the summary judgment 
trilogy, as well as the politicization (and partial paralysis) of the rulemaking process 
indicate the Enabling Act might usefully be rethought. See Miller, Deformation of 
Federal Procedure, supra note 77. For example, the composition of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee has been criticized for its “homogeneity” and ideological biases. 
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 172, at 784–92. 
 190. See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 370 (“For 
example, consideration should be given to abandoning the transsubstantive principle 
requiring that the Federal Rules be ‘general’ and applicable to all cases—a notion that 
supposedly is embedded in the Rules Enabling Act.”). See generally Robert G. Bone, 
Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324, 
333–34 (2008) (stating that trans-substantivity is not an “independent value” of the 
Federal Rules); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) 
(“[U]niformity and trans-substantivity . . . are a sham.”); David Marcus, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 371, 373 (2010) (discussing the history and precarious existence of trans-
substantivity). But cf. ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF 
PROCEDURE 75 (Foundation Press 1979) (arguing trans-substantivity promotes 
neutrality). Several of the existing Rules call for a different treatment of certain actions. 
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), 23.1, 23.2, 26(a). 
 191. See Richard McMillan, Jr. & David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track 
Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
431 (1985) (proposing a fast-track process for certain disputes); Miller, 
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assigning them to different procedural tracks by dimension or complexity, 
as has been employed in other countries,192 and what we already do with 
limited jurisdiction and specialized courts at both the state and federal 
level, may be worth considering. Perhaps fast-tracking some categories of 
run-of-the-mine cases would lead to their expeditious merit adjudication. 
Why should they be plagued by “plausibility” pleading, proportionate 
discovery inquiries, and time and resource consuming summary judgment 
motion practice?193 
Realistically, I doubt that much of this is feasible in the near term. The 
undertaking would be too risky and grandiose. Moreover, a meaningful 
overhaul would call for the kind of consensus and political activity 
unlikely to materialize let alone bear fruit given the current makeup of 
Congress and the federal courts, as well as the lobbying power of the 
defense community. Questions about procedure are out of the shadows. 
                                                                                                             
Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 370–71 (arguing that serious 
consideration should be given to the idea of “putting cases on different litigation 
tracks and devising different procedures that are deemed appropriate for the 
characteristics of the cases posted to each track”); Miller, Double Play on the 
Rules, supra note 34, at 118–25 (making similar suggestions); Stephen N. Subrin, 
The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One 
Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 398–405 (2010) (proposing 
a simple procedure for cases involving low-value disputes). 
 192. See ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES 
OF PRACTICE §§ 12.1–12.72 (3d ed. 2013) (describing tracking in the English system); 
ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] §§ 592, 689 (Ger.), 
reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (C.H. Beck ed., 57th ed. 1999) (delineating the 
German system of summary proceedings for actions seeking payment of a sum of 
money or the delivery of goods); see also PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, 
GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 425–28 (2004) (describing the German Code provision). 
Many civilian systems have specialized commercial courts or panels. See, e.g., CODE 
DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [CODE OF COMMERCE] arts. L.721-1 to 724-7 (Fr.); 
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] [Constitution of the Courts Act] § 105 (Ger.), 
reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (Richard Zöller ed., 23rd rev. ed. 2002). 
 193. The resource commitment by counsel and the court now common on 
summary judgment motions, for example, makes one wonder whether the frequency 
of today’s invocation of the procedure actually does not promote efficiency. See 
Marrero, supra note 88, at 1667–70. Judge Marrero suggests that the results of these 
motions may be “counterproductive” and are “decidedly unimpressive.” Id. There 
have been numerous expressions of concern at the state level about the federal 
procedural transformation discussed supra Part I, particularly with regard to the 
restrictions that impact the ability to secure the private enforcement of state law in the 
federal courts. See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure,  
70 STAN. L. REV. __(2018) (forthcoming 2018), https://Chicagounbound.uchicago 
.edu/journal_articles/8818/ [https://perma.cc/KW3G-WCEX]. 
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Whenever procedural changes are proposed these days, especially when 
the economic or regulatory consequences might be significant, the long 
knives come out and self-interest comes to the fore on both sides of the 
“v.”194 
I think the judge we remember and honor today had it right. He 
cautioned in a law review article: “No judge worthy of his office wants 
merely to dispose of cases as if he were working on an assembly line. We 
all seek the just result. We are all mindful of the adage that no case is decided 
until it is decided right.”195 A few years later, in a well-known dissent, he 
wrote: “Judicial case management, avoidance of delay, and denial of 
unjustified continuances are all commendable. They are, however, only 
means to an end. That end is justice; justice done and perceived to be 
done.”196 
How true and how relevant to what is happening in our courts today. 
That passage obliges us to think. Are we still serious about achieving “the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding” as Federal Rule 1 implores? There always has been a sense 
that the application of the Federal Rules should accommodate all three of 
those objectives.197 To me, “speedy” and “inexpensive” in Rule 1 should 
not be pursued at the expense of what is “just.” Although a short word, 
“just” embraces objectives of enormous significance that should not be 
subordinated to the other two. Should we—can we—preserve a Gold 
Standard procedural system? Can we afford not to? Even assuming it is 
efficient, does the current treatment of pleadings, discovery, motions to 
dismiss, class actions, expert witnesses, summary judgment, and the flight 
from the courthouse to arbitration and other private arrangements 
undermine the societal values of the public courts?  
                                                                                                             
 194. I am still capable of modest optimism on occasion. See generally Miller, 
Preservation and Rejuvenation, supra note 62, at 296–300.  
 195. Alvin B. Rubin, Views From the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 
453 (1976).  
 196. McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1353 (5th Cir. 
1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting). A decade earlier, as a district judge, he wrote: “This 
feeling that justice is a supreme goal, this sense that it is a predicate to organized 
society, is no mere yearning, for it is only a fair proceeding . . . that we can with 
any legitimacy call another human being to account.” United States v. McDaniels, 
379 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (E.D. La. 1974). 
 197. Admittedly, these objectives always have been somewhat in tension with 
each other; the words are inherently ambiguous, and their meaning is quite 
subjective. 
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EPILOGUE 
I leave these matters to those of you who are inheriting the system. 
After all, you are now the trustees of civil justice and cannot simply blame 
your predecessors for its warts and bumps and do nothing about them. You 
must now try to give the words in Rule 1 meaning for the future. As for 
me, having said my piece and having tried to channel Judge Rubin, 
perhaps it is time to lie down in a pasture, munch grass, and stop bothering 
people by asking them questions like: What are courts for? 
 
